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ABSTRACT. 
We evaluate the claim that individuals exhibit a magnitude effect in their discounting behavior,
which is said to occur when higher discount rates are inferred from choices made with lower
principals, all else being equal. If the effect is robust, as claimed, we should be able to see it using
procedures that are more familiar to economists. Using data collected from a representative sample
of adult Danes, we find statistically significant evidence of a small magnitude effect, at levels that are
much smaller than is typically claimed. This evidence only surfaces if one carefully controls for
unobserved individual heterogeneity in the population. And it disappears completely if we include
discounting choices in which both options have some time delay.
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1. Introduction
One anomaly about discounting behavior is known as the “magnitude effect”: the finding
that smaller amounts are discounted more than larger amounts. The magnitude effect has been
presented as an explanation to declining discount rates with horizon, and would suggest that these
differences should disappear if principals were larger. If magnitude effects are sufficiently large, as
the literature is suggesting, they may account for behavior otherwise attributed to quasi-hyperbolic
preferences. Quite apart from the issue of non-constancy of discount rates, if the magnitude effect is
significant, cost-benefit analysis cannot use one discount rate independent of the scale of the project.
We present new evidence on the magnitude effect from a methodology that is based on real rewards,
transparent elicitation procedures that are incentive compatible, joint estimation of risk and time
preferences, and allowing for observable and unobservable subject heterogeneity when inferring
discount rates. 
One theory that predicts magnitude effects hypothesizes that individuals might be using a
fixed monetary premium to decide whether to choose delayed payments rather than earlier
payments, as well as some premium for delay that varies with horizon (Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter
[2010]). In this case a subject might want to receive a minimum of $10 before delaying receipt: as the
principal increases from $100 to $1000, say, the discount rate at which the subject switches from the
sooner to the later payment decreases, since $10 is proportionately less as the principal increases.
This theory is important because it suggests that evidence for sharply declining discount rates with
horizon would disappear as the principal gets larger and larger. A direct test of the magnitude effect
presents itself in this theory formulation: present subjects with two different principals and see if
there is a difference in behavior.
We conduct experiments with a representative sample of adult Danes to see if there is
anything here that should be of concern to economists. We do in fact find statistically significant
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evidence for the magnitude effect, after one carefully controls for unobserved individual
heterogeneity, but at levels that are dramatically lower than previously reported. It disappears completely
when we include choices in which both options involve a time delay.
Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue [2002; p. 363] cite the following studies supporting
the magnitude effect, in historical order: Thaler [1981], Ainslie and Haendel [1983], Loewenstein
[1987], Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil [1989], Holcomb and Nelson [1992], Raineri and Rachlin
[1993], Shelley [1993], Green, Fristoe and Myerson [1994], Green, Fry and Myerson [1994], Kirby
and Maraković [1995], Kirby [1997] and Kirby, Petry and Bickel [1999]. To this list we would add
Chapman and Elstein [1995], Chapman [1996], Kirby and Maraković [1996], Green, Myerson and
McFadden [1997], Du, Green and Myerson [2002], Estle, Green, Myerson and Holt [2007],
Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter [2010] and Scholten and Read [2010]. We carefully review the most
cited studies in Appendix A, and every other study in Appendix C (available on request). Table 1
contains a summary tabulation of procedures and findings.
In section 2 we present our experimental design, in section 3 we specify a structural
econometric model to infer discount rates, and in section 4 we report our findings. Section 5
concludes.
 
2. Experiments
To set the stage minimally for the discussion about experimental design, we define the
discount factor for a given horizon τ to be the scalar D that equates the utility of the income
received at time t with the income received at time t+τ:
U(yt) = D U(yt+τ) (0)
for some utility function U(.). This general definition permits the special case, much studied in the
experimental literature, in which U(.) is linear. There is also nothing in (0) that restricts us to
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Expected Utility Theory (EUT).
The discount factor for the Exponential specification is defined as
Dt = 1/(1+δ)t (1)
for t$0, and where the discount rate d is simply
dt = δ (2)
Although these characterizations are abstract, we view the discount rate on an annualized basis
throughout. The key feature of this model, of course, is that the discount rate is a constant over
time. The percentage rate at which utility today and utility tomorrow is discounted is exactly the
same as the rate at which utility in 7 days and utility in 8 days is discounted. For our immediate
purposes the exact form of the discounting function is of no consequence: one can view the
Exponential specification descriptively as simply a convenient summary statistic for the effect of
magnitude on elicited discount rates.
A. Design
An important aspect of our methodological contribution to the literature on magnitude
effects is the provision of sizable monetary incentives that are paid out, rather than stated as
hypothetically paid. This sharpens the incentives for respondents to truthfully report their
preferences. Subjects are presented with two tasks.1 The first task identifies individual discount rates,
and the second task identifies a-temporal risk attitudes and hence the concavity of the utility
function. Observed choices from both tasks are then used to jointly estimate structural models of
the discounting function defined over utility of income.
Using real monetary incentives comes with budgetary consequences for the researcher. Two
1 A complete list of parameter values for all choices is presented in Appendix B (available on request).
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different procedures could be used to keep such budgets reasonable: one could either use relatively
small money amounts for both the smaller and the larger principal and pay every subject, or one
could use larger amounts but only pay for the task with some probability. There are drawbacks with
both of these approaches. Using small amounts can lead to confounding behavioral effects if
subjects are rounding off the money amounts. Using stochastic payments require sophisticated
portfolio analysis of the data or a maintained hypothesis that the independence axiom of Expected
Utility Theory holds. We have opted for avoiding the former approach due to the apparent strong
presence of rounding off that is prevalent in the Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter [2010] data, as we will
show below.2 We use a 10% chance for a subject to be paid, allowing us to use principals with
relatively high numerical values.
We illustrate the potential seriousness of rounding off behavior in Table 2. The first four
columns show the behavior that would be expected of a subject in a fill-in-the-blank elicitation task
if that subject had a 10% annualized discount rate. In this task the amount of money today in
column (1) is given to the subject, and the future amount is the response that would be expected of
someone that had a 10% discount rate, assuming no rounding off occurs. The horizon is shown in
days, and then in column (4) we see the implied annualized effective discount rate (AER), which by
construction here had better be 10%. Each block of rows in Table 2 shows a series of binary choices
with the same horizons, with the principal roughly doubling from block to block. Clearly the
monetary premia in column (5) are all very small.
The last four columns of Table 2 show what happens if the subject rounds up the filled-in
response to the next whole dollar. Thus column (6) is the same as column (1), and column (7) is
column (2) rounded up to the nearest dollar. The reason for rounding up, if one is going to round at
2 We also have no reason to suspect that violations of the independence axiom would lead to
qualitatively different conclusions regarding the role of magnitude effects. 
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all, is apparent from column (5): rounding to the nearest  dollar would mean in most cases that the
future amount was literally the same as the principal, and that is intuitively false to even the most
cognitively challenged subject. But the impacts of this modest amount of rounding on the implied
discount rates in column (9) are staggering. Two frequently reported anomalies immediately emerge:
the appearance of declining discount rates with horizon, and declining discount rates with the
magnitude of the principal.
Some evidence of rounding off behavior is found in Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter [2010]. In
their experiment 27 subjects were given the task to fill-in-the-blank for future payments, based on
exactly the horizons and principals shown in Table 2. They also did a comparable fill-in-the-blank
task with the same 27 subjects in which a future amount was given and the subject had to choose the
current amount to match. Out of 1,620 observed responses, a staggering 95.6% reported amounts
only in whole dollars.3 
This chilling arithmetic follows from the very argument that motivates the theory exposition
in Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter [2010]. What if subjects discount the future with some fixed
monetary premium, irrespective of horizon, rather than some premium that is a proportion of the
principal, as assumed in quasi-hyperbolic specifications? The upshot is implied by Table 2, but can
be seen immediately by assuming a principal of $10 and the horizons of 3, 7, 14, 30, 91 and 181
days, and a fixed monetary premium of $1. The implied discount rates are 1178%, 500%, 249%,
116%, 38% and 19%, respectively, showing striking evidence of “hyperbolicky” discounting. Then
change the principal to $100, and the same monetary premium only implies discount rates of 121%,
52%, 26%, 12%, 4% and 2%, respectively, and a “magnitude effect.”
By using relatively large principals we avoid the confounding effects from rounding off
3 Morever 3.2% were rounded to the nearest $0.50, and 0.6% to the nearest $0.25, leaving only 11
responses, or 0.7% , to be reported with more precision.
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behavior, and can more clearly test the presence of magnitude effects. 
Individual Discount Rates
Individual discount rates are examined by asking subjects to make a series of choices over
two certain outcomes that differ in terms of when they will be received. For example, one option
can be 3000 kroner today, and another option can be 3300 kroner in 60 days.4 If the subject picks
the earlier option we can infer that their discount rate is below 10% for 60 days, and if the subject
picks the later option we can infer that their discount rate is above 10% for that horizon. By varying
the amount of the later option we can identify the discount rate of the individual, conditional on
knowing the utility of those amounts to this individual. One can also vary the time horizon to
identify the discount rate function. This method has been widely employed in the United States (e.g.,
Coller and Williams [1999]), Denmark (e.g., Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002]), and Canada (e.g.,
Eckel, Johnson and Montmarquette [2005]).
We ask subjects to evaluate choices over several time horizons. We consider time horizons
between 2 weeks and 1 year. Each subject is presented with choices over four time horizons, and
those horizons are drawn at random, without replacement, from a set of thirteen possible horizons
(2 weeks, and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 months). This design will allow us to obtain a
smooth characterization of the discount rate function across the sample for horizons up to one year.
Of course, the key treatment here is to vary the principal. We employ two levels of the
principal, 1500 kroner and 3000 kroner, on a between-subjects basis. We also vary the order in
which the time horizon was presented to the subject: either in ascending order or descending order.
4 Much of the literature in economics employs a front end delay such that the earlier option is delayed
by some time period, such as one week or one month (e.g., Coller and Williams [1999], Harrison, Lau and
Williams [2002]). Virtually none of the studies documenting a magnitude effect employ a front end delay, so
we also avoid it here in our baseline design.
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Similarly, we vary the provision of implied interest rates for each choice on a between-subjects basis,
and independently of the two other treatments.
These three treatments, the level of the principal, the order of presentation of the horizon,
and information on implied interest rates result in a 2×2×2 design. Roughly c of the sample was
assigned at random to any one particular combination.
Risk Attitudes
Risk attitudes were evaluated by asking subjects to make a series of choices over outcomes
that involve some uncertainty. To be clear, risk attitudes are elicited here simply as a convenient
vehicle to estimate the non-linear utility function of the individual. The theoretical requirement,
from the definition of a discount factor in (0), is for us to know the utility function over income if
we are to correctly infer the discount rate the individual used. The discount rate choices described
above are not defined over lotteries.
Our design poses a series of binary lottery choices. For example, lottery A might give the
individual a 50-50 chance of receiving 1600 kroner or 2000 kroner to be paid today, and lottery B
might have a 50-50 chance of receiving 3850 kroner or 100 kroner today. The subject picks A or B. 
One series of 10 choices would offer these prize sets with probabilities on the high prize in each
lottery starting at 0.1, then increasing by 0.1 until the last choice is between two certain amounts of
money.  We present these pairwise choices, one pair at a time to the subject as a “pie chart” showing
prizes and probabilities. We gave subjects 40 choices, in four sets of 10 where each set had the same
prizes. The prize sets employed are as follows: [A1: 2000 and 1600; B1: 3850 and 100], [A2: 1125
and 750; B2: 2000 and 250], [A3: 1000 and 875; B3: 2000 and 75] and [A4: 2500 and 1000; B4: 4500
and 50]. The order of these four sets was random for each subject, but within each set the choices
were presented in an ordered manner, with increments of the high prize probability of 0.1.
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The typical findings from lottery choice experiments of this kind are that individuals are
generally averse to risk, and that there is considerable heterogeneity in risk attitudes across subjects:
see Harrison and Rutström [2008] for an extensive review. Much of that heterogeneity is correlated
with observable characteristics, such as age and education level (Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2007]),
although here we represent it with a random distribution that describes the full extent of preference
heterogeneity.
This design does not assume that behavior is better characterized by EUT or some other
model.
B. Sample and Procedures
Between September 28 and October 22, 2009, we conducted experiments with 198 Danes,
of which 89 received the lower principal of 1500 kroner and 109 received the higher principal of
3000 kroner. The sample was drawn to be representative of the adult population as of January 1,
2009, using sampling procedures that are virtually identical to those documented at length in
Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan [2005]. We received a random sample of the population aged
between 18 and 75, inclusive, from the Danish Civil Registration Office, stratified that by geographic
area, and sent out 1969 invitations.5 The experiments reported here are a sub-sample of the
complete sample (which was 413 subjects), only including those who did not have a front end delay
to the sooner option.
Our experiments were all conducted in hotel meeting rooms around Denmark, so that travel
5 That recruiting sample was drawn by us from a random sample which includes information on sex,
age, residential location, marital status, and whether the individual is an immigrant. At a very broad level our
sample was representative on average: the sample of 50,000 had an average age of 49.8, 50.1% of them were
married, and 50.7% were female; our final sample of 413 subjects had an average age of 48.7, 56.5% of them
were married, and 48.2% were female.
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logistics for the sample would be minimized. Various times of day were also offered to subjects, to
facilitate a broad mix of attendance. The largest session had 15 subjects, but most had fewer. The
 procedures were standard: Appendix B (available on request) documents an English translation of
the instructions, and shows typical screen displays. Subjects were given written instructions, which
were also read out, and then made choices in a trainer task, which was “played out” so that the full
set of consequences of each choice were clear. In fact, subjects were paid Big Ben caramels instead of
money for all trainers, and the payments were happily consumed when delivered. All interactions
were by computer. The order of the block of discount rate tasks and the block of risk attitudes tasks
was randomized for each session. After all choices had been made the subject was asked a series of
standard socio-demographic questions.
There were 40 discounting choices and 40 risk attitude choices, and each subject had a 10%
chance of being paid for one of each set. Average payments on the first block were 228 kroner
(although some were for deferred receipt) and on the second block the average was 218 kroner, for a
combined average of 446 kroner. The exchange rate at the time was close to 5 kroner per U.S.
dollar, so earnings averaged $89 per two-hour session for these tasks. Subjects were also paid 300
kroner or 500 kroner fixed show-up fee, and earnings from additional tasks completed after the
tasks of interest here were completed.6
For payments to be made in the future, the following language explained the procedures:
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. If you
receive some money today, then it is paid out at the end of the experiment. If you
receive some money to be paid in the future, then it is transferred to your personal
bank account on the specified date. In that case you will receive a written
confirmation from Copenhagen Business School which guarantees that the money is
6 An extra show-up fee of 200 kroner was paid to 35 subjects who had received invitations stating
300 kroner, but then received a final reminder that accidentally stated 500 kroner. In general, the additional
tasks earned subjects an average of at least 370 kroner (the exact amount depended on later decisions by other
subjects), so total earnings from choices made in the session averaged 722.9 kroner, or roughly $145.
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reserved on an account at Danske Bank. You can send this document to Danske
Bank in a prepaid envelope, and the bank will transfer the money to your account on
the specified date.
Payments by way of bank transfer are common in Denmark, Copenhagen Business School is well-
known in Denmark, and Danske Bank is the largest financial enterprise in Denmark as measured by
total assets.
3. Econometrics
Although the core treatment is a simple one, varying the principal, inferences about implied
discount rates requires attention to the definition of a discount rate in terms of utility streams, as
shown earlier in (0). The approach we adopt is direct estimation by maximum simulated likelihood
of some structural model of a latent choice process in which the core parameters defining risk
attitudes and discounting behavior can be estimated. We review the basic inferential logic for
estimating risk attitudes, and discuss the extension to discounting behavior. We employ maximum
simulated likelihood because we estimate the main structural parameters as random coefficients, to
reflect unobserved individual heterogeneity.
A. Estimating the Utility Function
Assume that utility of income is defined by
U(y) = M(1!r)/(1!r) (3)
where M is the lottery prize and r…1 is a parameter to be estimated. For r=1 assume U(M)=ln(M) if
needed. Thus r is the coefficient of CRRA: r=0 corresponds to risk neutrality, r<0 to risk loving,
and r>0 to risk aversion. Let there be two possible outcomes in a lottery. Under EUT the
probabilities for each outcome Mj, p(Mj), are those that are induced by the experimenter, so
expected utility is simply the probability weighted utility of each outcome in each lottery i plus some
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level of background consumption ω:
EUi = [ p(M1) × U(ω+M1) ] + [ p(M2) × U(ω+M2) ] (4)
The EU for each lottery pair is calculated for a candidate estimate of r, and the index
LEU = EUA ! EUB (5)
calculated, where EUA is the lottery in Option A and EUB is the lottery in Option B as presented to
subjects. This latent index, based on latent preferences, is then linked to observed choices using the
cumulative logistic distribution function Λ(LEU). This “logit” function takes any argument between
±4 and transforms it into a number between 0 and 1. Thus we have the logit link function,
prob(choose Option A) = Λ(LEU) (6)
The index defined by (5) is linked to the observed choices by specifying that the lottery in Option A
is chosen when Λ(LEU)>½, which is implied by (6).
Thus the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the EUT and CRRA
specifications being true, depends on the estimates of r given the above statistical specification and
the observed choices. Assuming non-random coefficients for the moment, the conditional log-
likelihood is then
ln LRA = ln L(r; y, ω) = 3i [ (ln Λ(LEU)×I(yi = 1)) + (ln (1!Λ(LEU))×I(yi = !1)) ] (7)
where I(@) is the indicator function, and yi =1(!1) denotes the choice of the Option A (B) lottery in
risk aversion task i. Harrison and Rutström [2008; Appendix F] review procedures and syntax from
the popular statistical package Stata that can be used to estimate structural models of this kind, as
well as more complex non-EUT models.
We employ a behavioral error specification originally due to Fechner and popularized by Hey
and Orme [1994]. This error specification posits the latent index
LEU = (EUA ! EUB)/μ (5N)
instead of (5), where μ is a structural “noise parameter” used to allow some errors from the
-11-
perspective of the deterministic EUT model. This is just one of several different types of error story
that could be used, and Wilcox [2008] provides a masterful review of the implications of the
alternatives.7 As μ60 this specification collapses to the deterministic choice EUT model, where the
choice is strictly determined by the EU of the two lotteries; but as μ gets larger and larger the choice
essentially becomes random. When μ=1 this specification collapses to (5), where the probability of
picking one lottery is given by the ratio of the EU of one lottery to the sum of the EU of both
lotteries. Thus μ can be viewed as a parameter that flattens out the link functions as it gets larger.
An important contribution to the characterization of behavioral errors is the “contextual
error” specification proposed by Wilcox [2010]. It is designed to allow robust inferences about the
primitive “more stochastically risk averse than.” It posits the latent index
LEU = [(EUA ! EUB)ν]/μ (5O)
instead of (5N), where ν is a new, normalizing term for each lottery pair. The normalizing term ν is
defined as the maximum utility over all prizes in this lottery pair minus the minimum utility over all
prizes in this lottery pair. The value of ν varies, in principle, from lottery choice to lottery choice:
hence it is said to be “contextual.” For the Fechner specification, dividing by ν ensures that the
normalized EU difference [(EUA ! EUB)/ν] remains in the unit interval.
B. Estimating the Discounting Function
Assume EUT holds for choices over risky alternatives and that discounting is exponential. A
subject is indifferent between two income options Mt and Mt+τ if and only if
U(ω+Mt) + (1/(1+δ)τ) U(ω) = U(ω) + (1/(1+δ)τ) U(ω+Mt+τ) (8)
7 Some specifications place the error at the final choice between one lottery or after the subject has
decided which one has the higher expected utility; some place the error earlier, on the comparison of
preferences leading to the choice; and some place the error even earlier, on the determination of the expected
utility of each lottery.
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where U(ω+Mt) is the utility of monetary outcome Mt for delivery at time t plus some measure of
background consumption ω, δ is the discount rate, τ is the horizon for delivery of the later monetary
outcome at time t+τ, and the utility function U is separable and stationary over time. The left hand
side of equation (8) is the sum of the discounted utilities of receiving the monetary outcome Mt at
time t (in addition to background consumption) and receiving nothing extra at time t+τ, and the
right hand side is the sum of the discounted utilities of receiving nothing over background
consumption at time t and the outcome Mt+τ (plus background consumption) at time t+τ. Thus (8) is
an indifference condition and δ is the discount rate that equalizes the present value of the utility of
the two monetary outcomes Mt and Mt+τ, after integration with an appropriate level of background
consumption ω.8
We can write out the likelihood function for the choices that our subjects made and jointly
estimate the risk parameter r in equation (3) and the discount rate parameter δ in (8). We use the
same stochastic error specification as in (5N).9 Instead of (5N) we have
LPV = (PVA ! PVB)/μ, (9)
where the discounted utility of Option A is given by
PVA = (ω+MA)(1!r)/(1!r) + (1/(1+δ)τ) ω(1!r)/(1!r) (10)
and the discounted utility of Option B is
PVB = ω(1!r)/(1!r) + (1/(1+δ)τ) (ω+MB)(1!r)/(1!r), (11)
and MA and MB are the monetary amounts in the choice tasks presented to subjects. We assume here
8 Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008b] show that the addition of background consumption
is a sufficient condition to avoid negative discount rates when the intertemporal utility function is additively
separable. 
9 We do not need to apply the contextual utility correction ν for these choices since they are over
deterministic monetary amounts.
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that the utility function is stable over time and is perceived ex ante to be stable over time.10
Thus the likelihood of the discount rate responses, conditional on the EUT, CRRA and
exponential discounting specifications being true, depends on the estimates of r, δ and μ, given the
assumed value of ω and the observed choices. The conditional log-likelihood is
ln LDR = ln L (r, δ, μ; y, ω) = 3i [ (ln Λ(LPV)×I(yi=1)) + (ln (1!Λ(LPV))×I(yi=!1)) ] (12)
where yi =1(!1) again denotes the choice of Option A (B) in discount rate task i.
The joint likelihood of the risk aversion and discount rate responses can then be written as
ln L (r, δ, μ; y, ω) = ln LRA + ln LDR (13)
where LRA is defined by (7) and LDR is defined by (12). This expression can then be maximized using
standard numerical methods. The parameter ω is set exogenously: using data from the household
expenditure survey at Statistics Denmark, Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a; p.600,
Appendix D] calculate per capita consumption of private nondurable goods on an average daily basis
as being equal to 118 kroner in 2003.11 We adjust that amount for inflation to the time of our
experiments, and assume ω = 130 kroner.
Nothing in this inferential procedure relies on the use of EUT, or the CRRA functional
form. Nor does anything rely on the use of the Exponential discounting function. In fact, following
the literature on the magnitude effect, we can employ the Exponential discounting function here
descriptively, since all we are interested in here is whether the discount rate differs as we vary the
principal. Our methods generalize immediately to alternative models of decision making under risk,
10 Direct evidence for the former proposition is provided by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström
[2008b], who examine the temporal stability of risk attitudes in the Danish population. The second
proposition is a more delicate matter: even if utility functions are stable over time, they may not be
subjectively perceived to be, and that is what matters for us to assume that the same r that appears in (3)
appears in (10) and (11). When there is no front end delay, as here, this assumption is immediate for (10), but
not otherwise.
11 Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a; p.602] show that estimates are robust to variations
of ω between 50 and 200 kroner.
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and especially to alternative discounting functions, as demonstrated by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and
Rutström [2011].
C. Random Coefficients
We account for unobserved individual heterogeneity through the possibility that the
coefficients r and δ are random coefficients following some parametric distribution. In other words, one
can allow the coefficients r and δ to be distributed in a random manner across the population: each
subject behaves as if they have a specific r and δ, but there is variation across subjects and that
variation is assumed to be characterized by some parametric distribution.
For example, if δ is assumed to vary according to a Normal distribution, then one would
estimate two “hyper-parameters” to characterize that distribution: a population mean of δ and a
population standard deviation of δ.12 Each of these hyper-parameters would have a point estimate and
a standard error, where the latter derives from familiar sampling variability. As the sample size
increases, and assuming consistent estimators, the sampling error on the population mean and the
population standard deviation would converge to 0, but there is no presumption that the point
estimate for the population standard deviation converge to 0, since it is a characteristic of the population
and not sample variability.
We use non-linear “mixed logit” methods developed by Andersen, Harrison, Hole, Lau and
Rutström [2010] to estimate such specifications. In fact, we also allow the distribution for r and δ to
be a Logit-Normal distribution, which is a logistic transform of a normally distributed variable. Due
originally to Johnson [1949], and familiar in bio-statistics, this transformation allows the resulting
distribution to closely approximate a flexible Beta distribution: it allows skewness and bimodality.
12 In fact we allow for a non-zero correlation between these two random coefficients, so their
covariance is a third hyper-parameter to be estimated.
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The domain is restricted to the unit interval, but it is a simple matter to expand that to any finite
interval.
4. Results
A direct test of the magnitude effects is offered by varying the principal offered to
respondents. The analysis of the data is therefore a simple matter: did the higher principal generate
discount rates that were lower than the discount rates generated by the lower principal?  We elicited
discount rates over a horizon between 2 weeks and one year. Although this analysis could be
performed on quasi-hyperbolic or hyperbolic discounting functions, the exponential discounting
model offers a parsimonious one-parameter alternative, and in line with our previous findings in
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2011]. Hence we consider a single discount rate across time
horizons when comparing the effect of the principal.
Figure 1 illustrates the random coefficient estimates for the pooled data spanning our two
treatments, to help better understand these kind of estimates.13 The parameters of the underlying
Normal distribution are shown, and the logistic transform Λ then applied to them. For the risk
aversion parameter r we estimate a mean for the Normal distribution of !0.34 and a standard
deviation of 0.93: these are not  the estimates for the parameter r itself, but the parameters defining
the argument of the logistic transform, so we end up with the population distribution Λ(N(!0.34,
0.93)) shown in Figure 1. The population distribution is generally risk averse, with a mean of 0.57
and a standard deviation of 0.19. The population distribution for the discount rate is sharply,
positively skewed.14 The median discount rate in the population is 0.055, the average discount rate is
13 The covariance between the two random coefficients is so close to 0 that we set it to 0 in this
pooled estimation to improve numerical stability.
14 There is one technical issue of importance here, however. As flexible as the Logit-Normal is, it
only allows bimodality at the end-points of the finite interval allowed. In this case we constrained the domain to
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0.101, and the standard deviation of 0.11. Of course, since this is a skewed distribution, one should
not infer statistical insignificance from the standard deviation equaling or exceeding the mean. For
the same reason, the appropriate measure of central tendency of the population distribution is the
median rather than the mean.
For the high principal the covariance between the two random coefficients is !0.35, with a
95% confidence interval between !0.43 and !0.27; so we reject the hypothesis that the two
coefficients are independent. This covariance implies a correlation of !0.22, which of course is
consistent with the application of Jensen’s Inequality to (0), which shows that a more concave utility
function must decrease inferred discount rates for given choices between the two monetary options.
We obtain virtually identical estimates of the correlation for the low principal sample.
Figure 2 then displays the estimated population distribution for the discount rate according
to the level of the principal. We observe a statistically significant difference, and in the direction of
the magnitude effect, although the quantitative magnitude is much smaller than conventionally
reported. The median discount rate for the low principal is 6.6%, and the average is 15.9%; the
median discount rate for the high principal is 4.3%, and the average is 9.9%. These distributions are
significantly different from each other, consistent with the visual impression from Figure 2.
The magnitude effect remains present, but even smaller in relative terms, if we assume linear
utility functions. Figure 3 shows the population distributions obtained with this (incorrect)
assumption.  With the low principal the median discount rate is 0.127, the mean discount rate is
0.281, and the standard deviation is 0.317; with the high principal the median discount rate is 0.123,
the mean discount rate is 0.244, and the standard deviation is 0.272. Although there remain
be between 0 and 0.6, and hence the mode close to 0 might  be an artefacts of that assumption. Although we
know a priori that δ$0, we do not know the upper bound. One can loop through alternative parametric
assumptions of the upper bound and evaluate the maximum likelihood at each: these are known as profile
likelihoods. In our case the qualitative results are invariant to assuming upper bounds lower than 0.6. A better
solution, and common in the statistical literature to allow “internal modes,” is to allow mixtures.
-17-
significant differences in the two distributions, these are very small differences in discount rates.
Finally, we have actually thrown away roughly one-half of the data we collected by focusing
solely on tasks in which the sooner option was to be delivered now. The missing half involved
choices in which the sooner option was to be delivered in 30 days from the date of choice, so that
both options had some delay. This “front end delay” is intended to reduce the differences in
subjective transactions costs of realizing either option. Collecting money at the end of the session is
simply more credible than relying on someone to send a bank deposit in one month. The vast bulk
of the literature on the magnitude effect assumes no front end delay, hence our main analyses
focused on that case. Figure 4 shows the effect of adding in the choices with a front end delay. The
magnitude effect disappears. The median discount rates are 13% and 13%, and the mean discount
rates are 5.4% and 6.4%, for the low and high principals, respectively. So there is effectively no
difference by treatment, and the difference in means is in the opposite direction of the conventional
magnitude effect.
Choices with a front end delay are appropriate characterizations of many financial decisions,
but not all economic decisions. We view each as appropriate in different settings.
5. Conclusions
We use real incentives with large monetary rewards to avoid possible rounding effects. With
some exceptions, noted in our literature review, all evidence of the magnitude effect that meets
certain minimal standards of salience and design occurs in samples of college-age students. We do
observe a statistically significant magnitude effect in the discounting behavior of adult Danes making
choices of deferred monetary payments, but it is not very large: the size of the effect depends on
whether one looks at median estimates or mean estimates. The preferred median estimates,
correcting for unobserved individual heterogeneity and non-linear utility functions, differ only by 2.3
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percentage points, from 6.6% to 4.3%, and the mean estimates differ by 6.0 percentage points, from
15.9% to 9.9%. Given the sharp skewness of the population distribution, there is an argument for
focusing on the median, but we report each measure of central tendency. 
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Table 1: Review of Experimental Literature on the Magnitude Effect
Study
Sample
(Size)
Elicitation
Method Horizon(s)
Principal
Amounts
Discount
Ratesa
Hypothetical
or Real?
Thaler [1981] Students
(N . 60)
Open-ended
Fill-in-the-blank 
3, 6, 12, 36, 60, 120
months
$15, $75, $250,
$1200, $3000
(120%, 139%), 98%, (34%, 69%, 120%),
69%, 29% for 12 months 
Hypothetical
Ainslie & Haendel [1983] Patients
(N=18, 66 choices)
Choice 3 days $2 up to $10 Not reported by magnitude Real
Loewenstein [1987] Students
(N = 30)
Open-ended
Fill-in-the-blank
3 hours, 1 day, 3
days, 1 year, 10 years
$4 loss and $1000 loss 8772%, 3395%, 115%, 62%, 11% for $4,
8772%, 1469%, 25%, 9%. 4% for $1000
Hypothetical
Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil [1989] Economics and
finance students
(N = 204)
Open-ended
Fill-in-the-blank
6 months, 1, 2 and 4
years
$40, $200, $1000 and
$5000
46%, 32%, 29%, 19% for 6 months;
18%, 15%, 15%, 11% for 4 years
(averaged over scenarios)
Hypothetical
Holcomb and Nelson [1992] Business students
(N = 101)
Binary choice 1, 7 and 14 days $5 and $17 Impossible to determine, but fraction
choosing to delay imply magnitude effect
Real
Raineri and Rachlin [1993] Psychology course
requirement
(N = 120)
Titration 1, 6 and 12 months
(also 1, 5, 10, 25 and
50 years)
$100,
$10,000 and
$1 million
127%, 71%, 54% for $100; 12%, 32%,
29% for $10,000; 12%, 8%, 11% for $1
million
Hypothetical
Shelley [1993] Accounting students
(N = 74)
Open-ended
Fill-in-the-blank
6 months, 1, 2 and 4
years
$40, $200,
$1,000 and $5,000
24%, 15%, 14%, 14% for $40, $200,
$1000 and $5000, respectively, in the
neutral frame; no magnitude effect for
the payment or expedite frames
Hypothetical
Green, Fristoe and Myerson [1994] Students
(N = 24)
Binary choice with
titration on delays
1 week, 1 month
and 3 months
$20 & $50, $100 &
$500, $500 & $1250
100%, 71% and 30% Hypothetical
Green, Fry and Myerson [1994] Young and old adults
(N = 12 each group)
Titration 1 week, 1 and 6
months, 1, 3, 5, 10
and 25 years
$1,000 and $10,000 Young adults: 63%, 54%, 46%, 32%,
25% for $1,000;  40%, 34%, 29%, 19%, 
15% for $10,000
Hypothetical
Chapman & Elstein [1995]
Psychology Students
(N=70)
Open-ended
Fill-in-the-blank
6 months,  1, 2 and
4 years
$200, $1000, $5000
and $25000
For 6 months ($200, 400%), ($1000,
210%), ($5000 and $25000, 75%). For 1
year ($200, 200%), ($1000, 125%). Hypothetical
Psychology Students
(N=34)
1, 3, 6 and 12 years $500, $1000, $2060
and $4000
For 1 year ($500, 150%), ($1000, 125%),
($2060 and $4000, 50%)
Kirby & Marakovic [1995] Students (N=21) Open-ended
Sealed-bid auction
3 to 29 days $14.5 and $28.5 Not reported by magnitude Real
Students (N=18) 3 to 29 days $14.5 and $28.5 Not reported by magnitude Hypothetical
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Chapman [1996]
Students (N=40) Fill-in-the-blank 1, 3, 6 and 12 years $500, $1000, $2000
and $4000
For 1 year 115%, 115%, 75%, 75%,
respectively. For 3 years 60%, 50%, 40%,
40% respectively
Hypothetical
Students (N=77) Fill-in-the-blank 1 and 9 years Gains and losses of
$500, $1500 and
$4500
For 1 year gain of principal 130%, 55%,
55%  respectively, and for a loss of
principal 60%, 25%, 25%.
Hypothetical
Kirby & Marakovic [1996] Students
(N = 621)
Choice 10 - 70 days $16 up to $83 Not reported by magnitude “Almost
hypothetical”
Kirby [1997] Students & Others
(N = 24, 28, 20)
Bidding 1 - 29 days $10 or $20 in the
future
Daily rates of 5.6% (3.6%), 2.4% (1.4%),
3.5% (2.4%) for each sample and the $10
($20) magnitude, respectively.
Real
Green, Myerson & McFadden [1997] Students (N=20) Binary choice with
titration on delays
3 and 6 months, 1,
3, 5, 10 and 20 years
$100, $2000, $25000
(and $100,000 in the
future)
$100 principal: 75%, 50%, 39%, 17%,
18%, 10% and 8% by horizon; $2,000
principal, 21%, 19%, 12%, 10%, 12%,
10% and 7%; $25,000 principal:  12%,
10%, 9%, 8%, 8%, 5% and 6%
Hypothetical
Chapman & Winquist [1998] Students (N=50) Open-ended
Fill-in-the-blank
3 months Taxi ride: $5, $10,
$15, $20. Haircut:
$7.5, $15, $30, $60.
Restaurant dinner:
$20, $40, $80, $160.
Values inferred from eyeballing graphs.
Roughly 5000% at $5, slightly over
2000% for $20,  just under 2000% at $30,
and slightly in excess of 1000% at $160 
Hypothetical
Kirby, Petry & Bickel [1999] Adults in control
(N = 60)
Choice 7 - 186 days ($25 to $35), ($50 to
$60) and ($75 to $85)
Small but statistically significant
magnitude effect: no values reported
Real
Du, Green & Myerson [2002] Chinese, Japanese and
American Students
(N=79)
Titration 1, 3 and 9 months,
2, 5, 10, and 20
years
$200 and $10000 Values reported graphically, impossible
to infer numerically.
Hypothetical
Estle, Green, Myerson & Holt [2007] Students (N=47) Titration 1 week, 1 and 6
months, 1 and 3
years
$40 and $100 ANOVA Analysis. Magnitudes not
reported
Hypothetical
Benhabib, Bisin & Schotter [2010] Students
(N = 27)
Open-ended
Fill-in-the-blank
3 days, 1 & 2 weeks,
1, 3 & 6 months
$1, $4, $8, $15, $40,
$80 and many interim
values
Not reported by magnitude: inspection
of choices for 3 subjects (their Figure 1)
broadly consistent with effect
Real
Scholten and Read [2010] Adults on web
(N = 196)
Choice 16, 19 and 22
months
$25, $50, $100 and
$250
Not reported by magnitude Hypothetical
a: Discount rates are reported in order of stake magnitudes. Values in brackets are alternative rates for the same magnitude. 
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Table 2: Small Stakes and the Effects of Rounding
Amount
Today
Future
Amount
Horizon
in days AER
Monetary
Premium
Amount
Today
Future
Amount
Horizon
in days AER
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
$7 $7.01 3 10% $0.01 $7 $8 3 1661%
$6 $6.01 7 10% $0.01 $6 $7 7 813%
$5 $5.02 14 10% $0.02 $5 $6 14 478%
$3 $3.02 30 10% $0.02 $3 $4 30 352%
$2 $2.05 91 10% $0.05 $2 $3 91 163%
$1 $1.05 181 10% $0.05 $1 $2 181 140%
$14 $14.01 3 10% $0.01 $14 $15 3 849%
$12 $12.02 7 10% $0.02 $12 $13 7 420%
$10 $10.04 14 10% $0.04 $10 $11 14 249%
$8 $8.07 30 10% $0.07 $8 $9 30 144%
$7 $7.18 91 10% $0.18 $7 $8 91 54%
$4 $4.20 181 10% $0.20 $4 $5 181 45%
$24 $24.02 3 10% $0.02 $24 $25 3 500%
$22 $22.04 7 10% $0.04 $22 $23 7 233%
$19 $19.07 14 10% $0.07 $19 $20 14 134%
$17 $17.14 30 10% $0.14 $17 $18 30 70%
$14 $14.36 91 10% $0.36 $14 $15 91 28%
$8 $8.41 181 10% $0.41 $8 $9 181 24%
$39 $39.03 3 10% $0.03 $39 $40 3 309%
$36 $36.07 7 10% $0.07 $36 $37 7 143%
$32 $32.12 14 10% $0.12 $32 $33 14 80%
$28 $28.23 30 10% $0.23 $28 $29 30 43%
$20 $20.50 91 10% $0.50 $20 $21 91 20%
$15 $15.76 181 10% $0.76 $15 $16 181 13%
$80 $80.07 3 10% $0.07 $80 $81 3 151%
$75 $75.14 7 10% $0.14 $75 $76 7 69%
$70 $70.27 14 10% $0.27 $70 $71 14 37%
$65 $65.54 30 10% $0.54 $65 $66 30 19%
$60 $61.51 91 10% $1.51 $60 $62 91 13%
$40 $42.03 181 10% $2.03 $40 $43 181 15%
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Figure 2: Estimated Population Distribution of
Discount Rates by Magnitude of Principal
-23-
D
en
si
ty
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Estimated Population Distribution of Risk-Neutral ä
Low Magnitude
High Magnitude
Principal of 1500 kroner or 3000 kroner
Figure 3: Estimated Population Distribution of
Risk-Neutral Discount Rates by Magnitude of Principal
D
en
si
ty
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Estimated Population Distribution of ä
Low Magnitude
High Magnitude
Principal of 1500 kroner or 3000 kroner
Figure 4: Estimated Population Distribution of
Discount Rates by Magnitude of Principal
and Adding Responses with Front End Delay
-24-
References
Ainslie, George, and Hendel, V., “The Motives of the Will,” in E. Gottheil, K. Druley, T. Skodola,
and H. Waxman (eds.), Etiology Aspects of Alcohol and Drug Abuse (Springfield, IL: Charles C.
Thomas, 1983).
Ahlbrecht, Martin, and Weber, Martin, “An Empirical Study on Intertemporal Decision Making
under Risk,” Management Science, 43(6), June 1997, 813-826.
Andersen, Steffen; Harrison, Glenn W.; Hole, Arne Rise, Lau, Morten I., and Rutström, E. Elisabet,
“Non-Linear Mixed Logit,” Working Paper 2010-07, Center for the Economic Analysis of
Risk, Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, 2010; forthcoming, Theory and
Decision.
Andersen, Steffen; Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten I., and Rutström, E. Elisabet, “Eliciting Risk
and Time Preferences,” Econometrica, 76(3), 2008a, 583-619.
Andersen, Steffen, Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten I.; Rutström, E. Elisabet, “Lost in State Space:
Are Preferences Stable?” International Economic Review, 49(3), 2008b, 1091-1112.
Andersen, Steffen, Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten I.; Rutström, E. Elisabet, “Preference
Heterogeneity in Experiments: Comparing the Field and Laboratory,” Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 73, 2010, 209-224.
Andersen, Steffen; Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten I., and Rutström, E. Elisabet, “Discounting
Behavior: A Reconsideration,” Working Paper 2011-03, Center for the Economic Analysis of
Risk, Robinson College of Business, Georgia State University, January 2011.
Benhabib, Jess; Bisin, Alberto, and Schotter, Andrew, “Present-Bias, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting,
and Fixed Costs,” Games & Economic Behavior, 69(2), July 2010, 205-223.
Benzion, Uri; Rapoport, Amnon, and Yagil, Joseph, “Discount Rates Inferred from Decisions: An
Experimental Study,” Management Science, 35, 1989, 270-284.
Camerer, Colin, and Ho, Teck-Hua, “Violations of the Betweenness Axiom and Nonlinearity in
Probability,” Journal of Risk & Uncertainty, 8, 1994, 167-196.
Chapman, Gretchen B., “Temporal Discounting and Utility for Health and Money,” Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 22, 1996, 771-791.
Chapman, Gretchen B., and Elstein, A.S., “Valuing the Future: Discounting Health and Money,”
Medical Decision Making, 15, 1995, 373-386.
Chapman, Gretchen B., and Winquist, Jennifer R., “The Magnitude effect: Temporal Discount Rates
and Restaurant Tips,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 5, 1998, 119-123.
-25-
Coller, Maribeth, and Williams, Melonie B, “Eliciting Individual Discount Rates,” Experimental
Economics, 2, 1999, 107-127.
 Du, Wanjiang; Green, Leonard, and Myerson, Joel, “Cross-Cultural Comparisons of Discounting
Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards,” Psychological Record, 52, 2002, 479-492.
Eckel, Catherine; Johnson, Cathleen, and Montmarquette, Claude, “Savings Decisions of the
Working Poor: Short- and Long-term Horizons,” in J. Carpenter, G. W. Harrison and J. A.
List (eds.), Field Experiments in Economics (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Research in
Experimental Economics, Volume 10, 2005).
 
Estle, Sara J.; Green, Leonard; Myerson, Joel, and Holt, Daniel D., “Discounting of Monetary and
Directly Consumable Rewards,” Psychological Science, 18(1), 2007, 58-63.
Frederick, Shane; Loewenstein, George; and O’Donoghue, Ted, “Time Discounting and Time
Preference: A Critical Review,” Journal of Economic Literature, 40, June 2002, 351-401. 
Green, Leonard; Fristoe, Nathanael, and Myerson, Joel, “Temporal discounting and preference
reversals in choice between delayed outcomes,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1, 1994,
383-389.
Green, Leonard; Fry, Astrid F., and Myerson, Joel, “Discounting of Delayed Rewards: A Life-Span
Comparison,” Psychological Science, 5, 1994, 33-36.
Green, Leonard; Myerson, Joel, and McFadden, Edward, “Rate of Temporal Discounting Decreases
with Amount of Reward,” Memory & Cognition, 25(5), 1997, 715-723.
Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten, and Rutström, Elisabet, “Estimating Risk Attitudes in Denmark:
A Field Experiment,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 109(2), June 2007, 341-368.
Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten I.; Rutström, E. Elisabet, and Sullivan, Melonie B., “Eliciting Risk
and Time Preferences Using Field Experiments: Some Methodological Issues,” in J.
Carpenter, G.W. Harrison and J.A. List (eds.), Field Experiments in Economics (Greenwich, CT:
JAI Press, Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 10, 2005).
Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten I., and Williams, Melonie B., “Estimating Individual Discount
Rates for Denmark: A Field Experiment,” American Economic Review, 92(5), December 2002,
1606-1617.
Harrison, Glenn W., and Rutström, E. Elisabet, “Risk Aversion in the Laboratory,” in J.C. Cox and
G.W. Harrison (eds.), Risk Aversion in Experiments (Bingley, UK: Emerald, Research in
Experimental Economics, Volume 12, 2008).
Hey, John D., and Orme, Chris, “Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using
Experimental Data,” Econometrica, 62(6), November 1994, 1291-1326.
-26-
Holcomb, James H., and Nelson, Paul S., “Another Experimental Look at Individual Time
Preference,” Rationality and Society, 4, 1992, 199-220.
 
Johnson, N.L., “Systems of Frequency Curves Generated by Methods of Translation,” Biometrika,
36, January 1949, 149-176.
Kirby, Kris N., “Bidding on the Future: Evidence Against Normative Discounting of Delayed
Rewards,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 126, 1997, 54-70.
Kirby, Kris N., and Maraković, Nino N., “Modeling Myopic Decisions: Evidence of Hyperbolic
Delay-Discounting Within Subjects and Amounts,” Organizational Behavior & Human Decision
Processes, 64, 1995, 22-30.
Kirby, Kris N., and Maraković, Nino N., “Delay-Discounting Probabilistic Rewards: Rates Decrease
as Amounts Increase,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1996, 3:1, 100-104.
Kirby, Kris N., Petry, Nancy M., and Bickel, Warren K., “Heroin Addicts Have Higher Discount
Rates for Delayed Rewards Than Non-Drug-Using Controls,” Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 128, 1999, 78-87.
Loewenstein, George, “Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Outcomes,” Economic Journal, 97,
1987, 666-684.
Loewenstein, George, and Prelec, Drazen, “Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and
Interpretation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 1992, 573-592.
Myerson, Joel; Green, Leonard; Hanson, J. Scott; Holt, Daniel D., and Estle, Sara J., “Discounting
Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards: Processes and Traits,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 24,
2003, 619-635.
Noor, Jawwad, “Intertemporal Choice and the Magnitude Effect,” Games & Economic Behavior, 7(1),
May 2011, 255-270.
Plott, Charles R., and Zeiler, Kathryn, “The Willingness to Pay/Willingness to Accept Gap, the
‘Endowment Effect,’ Subject Misconceptions and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting
Valuations,” American Economic Review, 95(3), 2005, 530-545.
Rachlin, Howard; Brown, Jay, and Cross, David, “Discounting in Judgments of Delay and
Probability,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13, 2000, 145-159.
Raineri, Andres, and Rachlin, Howard, “The Effect of Temporal Constraints on the Value of Money
and Other Commodities,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 6, 1993, 77-94.
Read, Daniel, and Roelofsma, Peter H.M.P., “Subadditive versus Hyperbolic Discounting: A
Comparison of Choice and Matching,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91,
2003, 140-153.
-27-
Scholten, Marc, and Read, Daniel, “The Psychology of Intertemporal Tradeoffs,” Psychological Review,
2010, forthcoming. 
Shelley, Marjorie K., “Outcome Signs, Question Frames, and Discount Rates,” Management Science,
39, 1993, 806-815.
Thaler, Richard, “Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency,” Economics Letters, 8, 1981,
201-207.
Wilcox, Nathaniel T., “Stochastic Models for Binary Discrete Choice Under Risk: A Critical Primer
and Econometric Comparison,” in J. Cox and G.W. Harrison (eds.), Risk Aversion in
Experiments (Bingley, UK: Emerald, Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 12,
2008).
Wilcox, Nathaniel T., “‘Stochastically More Risk Averse:’ A Contextual Theory of Stochastic
Discrete Choice Under Risk,” Journal of Econometrics, 2010 forthcoming
(doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2009.10.012).
-28-
Appendix A: Literature Review
Thaler [1981] asked each individual to state the delayed amount that they would require to
be willing to give up a certain amount today. In each case there was a 3×3 design, varying the initial
amount and the time delay. For one group of subjects the amounts were $15, $250 and $3000, and
the delays 3 months, 1 year, and 3 years; for another group the amounts were $75, $250 and $1200,
and the delays 6 months, 1 year, and 5 years; and for the final group the amounts were $15, $250 and
$3000, and the delays 1 month, 1 year and 10 years.15 All choices were hypothetical, and the sample
consisted of U.S. college students. Median responses are reported, with no tests of statistical
significance. Table 1 tabulates these results, converted to the annual effective rate assuming daily
compounding. No statistical test is typically needed when the median or means are so different,
although one would like to know if the distributions had large variances or skewness.
Loewenstein [1987] reports the results of a hypothetical survey of 30 undergraduate
students. The only questions that address the magnitude effect involved the subjects stating the
delayed amounts that they would pay to avoid a $4 loss now and a $1000 loss now.16 The time delays
were 3 hours, 1 day, 3 days, 1 year and 10 years. Results are reported (Appendix 1, p. 681) as the
mean of the fraction of the willingness to pay to avoid the outcome now. So these fractions may be
viewed as discount factors, and discount rates inferred assuming an exponential model simply for
descriptive purposes. For the $4 amount the continuously compounded rates are 8772%, 3395%,
115%, 62% and 11%, and for the $1000 amount the corresponding rates are 8772%, 1469%, 25%,
9% and 4%. Ignoring the 3-hour horizon, and the decline with horizon, the larger amount clearly
15 Another group was presented comparable tasks framed as a loss. We focus here solely on choices
framed as gains.
16 There is no mention of the magnitude effect in this study, which addresses other concerns with
discounting. The other three questions involved willingness to pay for a $4 gain, willingness to pay for a kiss
from a movie star of your choice, and willingness to pay to avoid a non-lethal, 120-volt electric shock.
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generated lower discount rates.
Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil [1989] asked hypothetical fill-in-the-blank questions to 282
economics and finance students, of which 204 provided useable responses. They employed four
scenarios in which the respondents were asked to imagine a setting in which they had been asked to
postpone a receipt or a payment of an amount (hence they were told the amount x now and asked to
state the equivalent amount y in the future), or to expedite a receipt or a payment (hence they were
told the amount y in the future and asked to state the equivalent amount x now). The time horizons
considered were 0.5, 1, 2 and 4 years, and the stated amounts were $40, $200, $1000 and $5000. For
present purposes the main results are illustrated by averaging across scenarios, and focusing on the
shortest and longest horizons only (Table 2.C, p.278). Average discount rates for each stated amount
were 46%, 32%, 29% and 19%, respectively, for the 6-month horizon, and 18%, 15%, 15% and
11%, respectively, for the 4-year horizon. Although considerable noise is present in the data, and no
standard errors are reported, one can clearly see the magnitude effect pattern in the shorter-horizon
responses, and “faintly” in the longer-horizon data.
Holcomb and Nelson [1992] employed procedures that anticipate the more recent
application of modern experimental methods to the elicitation of discount rates, and indeed is
heavily cited by Coller and Williams [1999] in their seminal study. They used 101 business students
in a series of 41 binary choice tasks, where the sooner and later amounts were presented as given
and the subject simply needed to pick one. Treatments included the use of front end delays on the
sooner option of 0 days, 1 day or 7 days, the use of a low principal of $5 or a high principal of $17,
and the use of a low daily interest rate of 1.5% or a high daily interest rate of 3.0%. One of the 41
choices by each subject was selected for payment at the end of the session, so this appear to be the
first study to examine the magnitude effect with real rewards and incentive-compatible elicitation
-30-
procedures. Focusing on their results with no front end day and the higher interest rate, which are
representative in this case, they observe that 23%, 41% and 56% of the subjects chose to delay with
the principal of $5 and horizons of 1 day, 1 week and 2 weeks, respectively, whereas 53%, 79% and
87% chose to delay for the corresponding horizons when the principal was $17. Precise discount
rates cannot be inferred from this design without strong parametric assumptions, since we only
know that the discount rate was in the interval [0%, 1.5%), [1.5%, 3.0%) or [3%, 4%). But the
fractions reported are enough to conclude that there is a magnitude effect at work in these data.
Appendix C (available on request) collates the data reported in their tables and demonstrates that
there is a statistically significant magnitude effect.
Chapman [1996] is a remarkable study because it is the first to try to estimate discount rates
over the utility of time-dated final outcomes. It contains three experiments: the first two are
replications and extensions of the basic design of Chapman and Elstein [1995], and the third
attempts to correct for concave utility when inferring discount rates. We focus on the elicitation of
discount rates over monetary outcomes: a major theme in the overall design is a comparison of
discount rates defined over monetary and health outcomes. Experiment 1 posed 32 questions to 40
students fulfilling a course credit. These questions called for a fill-in-the-blank answer for the
amount of money in the future equal to a fixed amount today. Horizons of 1, 3, 6 and 12 years were
used, and principal amounts of $500, $1000, $2000 and $4000 employed. Geometric means of log-
transformed annual discount rates are used in the graphs, which provide the only basis for eyeballing
those values. Figure 1 (p.774) shows a clear magnitude effect, with discount rates for 1 year being
roughly 115%, 115%, 75% and 75% for each principal amount, respectively; for a 3-year horizon
these rates drop to 60%, 50%, 40% and 40%, respectively; this decline and convergence pattern
persists for the later horizons. Experiment 2 is similar, and extends the design to consider loss
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frames as well as gain frames. In this case the instrument contained 48 questions of the same fill-in-
the-blank format, administered to 77 students again fulfilling a course credit. The horizons were only
1 year and 9 years, and the principal amounts were $500, $1500 and $4500. The evidence suggests a
clear magnitude effect for the 1 year horizon, and none for the 9 year horizon. For the shorter
horizon, the discount rates, eyeballed from Figure 2A (p. 778) are 130% for a gain of $500, 55% for
gains of $1500 or $4500, 60% for a loss of $500, and 25% for losses of $1500 or $4500. Thus there
is evidence of a diminishing magnitude effect in these data.
Experiment 3 of Chapman [1996] is the one that seeks to correct for concave utility. Given
the importance this takes on later in the literature, it is worthwhile documenting the clarity of the
motivation:
In the studies so far, discount rates were calculated as the percentage increase in
dollars or years of full health needed to offset a delay. An alternative way to calculate
discount rates would be the percentage increase in utility needed to offset a delay.
These two calculations will be different if utility is not a linear function of dollars or
years of full health.
The experimental design contains 38 questions which follow the style of Experiment 2, to elicit
discount rates defined over monetary outcomes if one assumes linear utility. The horizons were 1, 3
and 9 years, the principal amounts were $500, $1000 and $4500, and gain and loss frames were again
considered. Eyeballing Figure 5A (p. 784) there is striking evidence of a magnitude effect for 1 and 3
years discount rates. This baseline, familiar from Experiments 1 and 2, is important in comparison to
the utility-corrected discount rates.
Utility scales were elicited using the following procedure (p. 782):
In Part 2, participants answered 18 utility assessment questions in which they
matched intervals to be of the same subjective magnitude (von Winterfeldt &
Edwards [1986; p. 232]). For example, participants considered the interval from $0 to
$500 and specified a value x such that the interval from $500 to $x was of the same
subjective magnitude.
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Specifically, participants were asked to consider two intervals; for example,
Interval A: You expected to win $0 but instead will win $500.
Interval B: You expected to win $500 but instead will win ___.
They were asked to specify the amount that would have to appear in the blank for
Interval B to make Interval B subjectively the same as Interval A. If a participant
answered, say, $1,200, the next question concerned an interval from $500 to $1,200
and a second from $1,200 to y, in which the participant must specify y. Participants
answered four such questions.
If one arbitrarily defines $0 to be 0 utiles and $500 to be 1 utile, then participants’
responses are associated with 2, 3, 4, and 5 utiles. To measure utility for monetary
losses, I asked participants to match the interval from $500 to $0 to the interval from
$0 to z, in which z was a negative amount. This answer corresponded to !1 utile.
Four additional questions specified !2, !3, !4, and !5 utiles.
From these responses power utility functions were estimated, one for each subject. Ignoring the
reliability of the determination of these utility functions for the moment, the implied utility discount
rates appear to exhibit no quantitatively significant magnitude effect! From her Figure 5E (p. 784)
the rates are between 20% and 5% for the 1 year horizon and the various principals, and between
15% and 5% for the 3 year horizon. Although these magnitude effects are statistically significant in
terms of an ANOVA test (Table 8, p. 785), Chapman [1996; p. 783] notes that, “Because of the very
curved utility function for money, utility discount rates for money were so low that differences were
hard to detect.” No data on the estimated exponents of these utility functions is presented, although
the graph of the average value of the estimates (Figure 3, p. 782) does suggest significant concavity.
What about the method for eliciting the utility function? This method is well-known from
several older literatures, cited by Wakker and Deneffe [1996; p. 1132], who extend it to eliciting
utilities over lotteries. The exposition in von Winterfeldt and Edwards [1986; p.232-5] is clear. If the
response to the first question about the amount of money, greater than $500, that makes you
indifferent to the gap between $0 and $500, is honest, this method is valid. But there are three
problems with this implementation, quite apart from it being hypothetical:
• The questions as posed by Chapman [1996] do not clearly ask the subject to state the
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increment in money that is the same in subjective utility terms as the baseline increment. The
language literally says, “you have $500, what new money amount would make you indifferent
to that.” There is a colloquial interpretation of the language that is just the “interval” she
assumes the subject responds to, but the language contains some ambiguities that one likes
to avoid in subject instructions if possible.
• The subject has no incentive to report the blank amount honestly.
• If the subject was motivated by this sequence of tasks, such as if it involved real stakes or the
subject kindly behaved as if it was real when it was not, then the rational response is to state
a very big number whenever a blank is asked for.
These last two problems are well-known with the Trade-Off Method that is in wide use, and that
was proposed by Wakker and Deneffe [1996]: see Harrison and Rutström [2008; §1.5] for an
extended discussion.
An additional econometric concern with the utility-adjustments used by Chapman [1996] is
that she did not jointly estimate the parameters of the utility function and discounting function.
Instead she estimated the former and then assumed the point estimate from that estimation when
inferring the latter, ignoring the sampling errors on the former when inferring the latter. Full
information maximum likelihood methods for undertaking this joint estimation are now well-known,
and reviewed by Harrison and Rutström [2008; §3.4].
For all these problems, and they are each conceptually serious, it is clear that Chapman
[1996] was an important advance on the elicitation and modeling of discount rates. Andersen,
Harrison, Rutström and Lau [2008] demonstrate how these problems can be avoided or solved.17
Kirby and Maraković [1996] undertook a clean experiment in which each subject was asked
to make 21 binary choices between a certain amount of money today and a larger amount of money
17 It is also appropriate to correct our earlier [2008] characterization of this study as not eliciting or
estimating risk attitudes. We noted then (p.611) that “Chapman [1996] drew the correct formal link between
estimation of individual discount rates and concavity of the utility function, but did not elicit risk attitudes.
Instead she used hypothetical questions to elicit individual discount rates over money and health, and then
estimated individual discount rates based on various assumptions about the risk attitudes of the subjects.”
Our current exposition makes it clear that she did much more than that.
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in the future. The principal was varied from choice to choice, as they were presented to subjects, as
was the larger amount and the horizon. The principal was varied between $16 and $83, the later
amount was varied between $30 and $85, and the horizon was varied between 10 and 70 days. This
design yielded choices that had annualized discount rates between 128% and 1.2E+13%. The
average subject started switching over to the later option when discount rates were above 596%, and
only 12% of subjects accepted the lowest discount rate of 128%. It is almost irrelevant if discounting
over this horizon was constant or not, since one can undertake thought experiments with longer
horizons and rule out such rates being accepted for those choice. One immediate concern with this
task is that it is “almost hypothetical.” Questionnaires were sent out to every undergraduate student
at Williams College, which had a student population of roughly 2000 at the time. Subjects were told
that the questionnaires could be returned before one of two days, and that on each day one would
be drawn at random and one of the 21 choices played out for real. Despite cheap talk in the
instructions that, to “make sure that you get a reward you prefer, you should assume that you are the
winner, and then make each choice as though it were the one that you will win,” these are very poor
financial incentives. Even if the subject was certain that the lottery with the (delayed) $85 payment
would be chosen, this is an expected earning of only $0.085. Although subjects were not told how
many of the questionnaires were distributed, this is a small campus and such things are not private.
In the event, 672 responded, implying that there was actually an expectation of only $0.25 if the
largest prize was then selected. Moreover, even if the largest payment was chosen in all 21 cases, the
expected earnings were only $56.19 per lucky subject, and not $85. It is a pity that this clean,
transparent task was marred by the use of poor incentives.
Kirby [1997] is a remarkable study: it used real incentives, used payments by subjects out of
their own cash, used an incentive-compatible second-price sealed-offer auction to elicit present
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values, considered the effect of varying the deferred amount ($10 or $20), and considered all odd-
numbered horizons between 1 and 29. Each subject entered 30 bids, and was told that one of these
bids would be selected at random for payment if the bid was the winning bid. Each auction
apparently consisted of the entire sample in an experiment, which does not affect the incentive
compatibility of the procedure. Subjects in experiment 1 were “pseudo-volunteers” receiving extra
credit in a psychology class for attending, but apart from the show-up rewards all payments were
salient. Subjects in experiments 2 and 3 were “people from the Williams College community,
including summer students, college staff, and persons unaffiliated with the college,” and recruitment
was by sign-up fliers and newspaper advertisements. Although it is not possible to infer proximate
discount rates without knowing horizons, the daily rates averaged 5.6% for the $10 amount and only
3.6% for the $20 amount in one experiment with 24 students completing a class credit; 2.4% and
1.4%, respectively, for 28 non-students recruited from the field; and 3.5% and 2.4%, respectively,
for 20 non-students. These were statistically significantly different from each other (p. 60, 62, 63),
and the implied annual rates would be extremely large.
Kirby, Petry and Bickel [1999] implement the procedures of Kirby and Maraković [1996]
with 56 heroin addicts and 60 control subjects. The control subjects were recruited by newspaper
advertisement, and then matched approximately to the demographics of the sample of heroin
addicts. Each subject was given 27 binary choices, and told that there was a 1-in-6 chance that one
of the 27 choices would be paid out. Thus these are incentivized tasks. The later amounts of money
were grouped into three reward sizes, small ($25 to $35), medium ($50 to $60) and large ($75 to 
$85), and horizons varied between 7 and 186 days. The results are reported (Table 3, p. 81) in terms
of the parameter K in the hyperbolic specification D(t) = 1/(1+ Kt) of the discount factor for
horizon t, and the number of subjects that were indifferent at that value (intervals were averaged).
-36-
For this specification the implied discount rate is d(t) = (1 + Kt)(1/t) ! 1. Thus for each discount rate
one can infer the fraction of subjects that have a discount rate less than that discount rate, and draw
inferences about the discount rates of the sample. In effect, this is an “interval regression” with a
constant, and with the sample weighted by the sample size. The raw data from their Table 3 is
collated in Appendix C (available on request). A grouped logistic analysis of those data shows that
there is a statistically significant magnitude effect, but that it is quantitatively small.
Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter [2010] present subjects with two types of fill-in-the-blank
tasks. In one type, the subject was asked 30 questions of the form “what amount of money, $x, if
paid to you today would make you indifferent to $y paid to you in t days?” In this case the amount
$y and the horizon t would be filled in: y 0 {10, 20, 30, 50, 100} and t 0 {3 days, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1
month, 3 months, 6 months}. The response $x was incentivized with a Becker, DeGroot and
Marschak [1964] (BDM) auction for one of the 30 choices selected at random. A price would be
drawn from a uniform distribution between [$0, $y], and if the random price was greater than the
stated amount $x then the subject would receive that random price immediately; otherwise the
subject would receive $y in t days. So the upper bound of the BDM auction was the larger amount
to be provided in the future. The other type of fill-in-the-blank question involved 30 questions of
the form, “what amount of money, $y, would make you indifferent between $x today and $y t days
from now? [upper bound = $z],” where the text in brackets was given to subjects as notation instead
of these words. In this case the values of t were the same as the first fill-in-the-blank task, and the
values of x 0 {1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7} for z=10, x 0 {4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14} for z=20, x 0 {8, 14, 17, 19, 22, 24}
for z=30, x 0 {15, 20, 28, 32, 36, 39} for z=50, and x 0 {40, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80} for z=100. The
same subjects were given both sets of questions on different days. The data were evaluated using a
flexible specification, and the model estimated for each individual using non-linear least squares. The
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individual estimates are very erratic, with a wide range of behaviors being inferred. The general
theme is of extremely high discount rates, reported to average 472%, and considerable noise.
Although they report evidence of significant magnitude effects (p. 209), they only show data from 3
subjects; presumably, those data are representative.
One major issue in this design is the subject comprehension of the BDM procedure, which
is often asserted by experimenters to be understood by subjects but often is not.18 In this design the
upper bound for the BDM procedure was varied with magnitude in a complicated manner, as one
can discern from inspection of the parameters listed above. This would not be an issue apart from
the fact that it appears to have been a behavioral focal point for elicited valuations. The striking
result is that the modal valuation was to bid the upper bound, and the majority were close to that
upper bound. This is a serious concern about the subject comprehension of the elicitation
procedure.
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Appendix B: Instructions (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
We document the instructions by first listing the “manuscript” that shows what was given to
subjects and read to them, and then we document some of the screen displays. The original Danish
manuscript is available on request. The originals were in 14-point font, printed on A4 paper for nice
page breaks (a horizontal line below indicates a page break), and given to subjects in laminated form.
Any experimenter that would like to buy a used laminating machine should contact Steffen
Andersen. The manuscript below was for the sessions in which the discount rate task was presented
first. After these experimental tasks were completed there were additional tasks in the session that
are not relevant here.
A. Experimental Manuscript
Welcome announcement
[Give informed consent form to subjects.]
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. The survey is financed by the Social
Science Research Council and the Carlsberg Foundation and concerns the economics of decision
making. 
Before we begin the survey, let me read out the informed consent form that is handed out to
you. This form explains your rights as a participant in the survey, what the survey is about and how
we make payments to you.
[Read the informed consent form.]
Is everyone able to stay for the full two hours of the meeting? Before we begin, I will ask
each of you to pick an envelope from me. The envelope contains a card with an ID number that we
will use to keep track of who answered which questions. All records and published results will be
linked to anonymous ID numbers only, and not to your name. Please keep your ID numbers private
and do not share the information with anyone else. 
[Each subject picks an envelope.]
You will be given written instructions during the survey, but make all decisions on the
computer in front of you. Please enter your ID number on the computer in front of you, but keep
the card for later use.
You will now continue with the first task. The problem is not designed to test you. The only
right answer is what you really would choose. That is why the task gives you the chance of winning
money. I will now distribute the instructions and then read it out loud. 
[Give IDR instructions to subjects.]
[Read the IDR instructions.]
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Task D
In this task you will make a number of choices between two options labeled “A” and “B”.
An example of your task is shown on the right. You will make all decisions on a computer.
All decisions have the same format. In the example on the right Option A pays 100 kroner
today and Option B pays 105 kroner twelve months from now. By choosing option B you would get
an annual return of 5% on the 100 kroner.
We will present you with 40 of these decisions. The only difference between them is that the
amounts and payment dates in Option A and B will differ. 
You will have a 1-in-10 chance of being paid for one of these decisions. The selection is
made with a 10-sided die. If the roll of the die gives the number 1 you will be paid for one of the 40
decisions, but if the roll gives any other number you will not be paid. If you are paid for one of these
40 decisions, then we will further select one of these decisions by rolling a 4-sided and a 10-sided
die. When you make your choices you will not know which decision is selected for payment. You
should therefore treat each decision as if it might actually count for payment.
You will receive the money on the date stated in your preferred option. If you receive some
money today, then it is paid out at the end of the experiment. If you receive some money to be paid
in the future, then it is transferred to your personal bank account on the specified date. In that case
you will receive a written confirmation from Copenhagen Business School which guarantees that the
money is reserved on an account at Danske Bank. You can send this document to Danske Bank in a
prepaid envelope, and the bank will transfer the money to your account on the specified date. 
Before making your choices you will have a chance to practice so that you better understand
the consequences of your choices. Please proceed on the computer to the practice task. You will be
paid in caramels for this practice task, and they are being paid on the time stated in your preferred
option.
[Subjects make decisions in the practice IDR task.]
I will now come around and pay you in caramels for your choice of A or B. Please proceed
to the actual task after your earnings are recorded. You will have a 1-in-10 chance of being paid for
one of the 40 decisions in the actual task. 
Password 1:____
[Subjects make decisions in the actual IDR task.]
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I will now come around and ask you to roll a 10-sided die to determine if you are being paid
for one of the decisions. If the roll of the die gives the number 1 you will be paid for one of the 40
decisions, but if the roll gives any other number you will not be paid. If you are paid for one of the
40 decisions, then I will ask you to roll a 4-sided and a 10-sided die to select one of the decisions for
payment. 
Password 2:____
[Roll 10-sided die to determine if they are being paid.]
[Roll 4-sided and 10-sided dice to determine the decision for payment.]
You will now continue with the second task. I will distribute the instructions and then read it
out loud. 
[Give RA instructions to subjects.]
[Read the RA instructions.]
Task L
In this task you will make a number of choices between two options labeled “A” and “B”.
An example of your task is shown on the right. You will make all decisions on a computer.
All decisions have the same format. In the example on the right Option A pays 60 kroner if
the outcome of a roll of a ten-sided die is 1, and it pays 40 kroner if the outcome is 2-10. Option B
pays 90 kroner if the outcome of the roll of the die is 1 and 10 kroner if the outcome is 2-10. All
payments in this task are made today at the end of the experiment.
We will present you with 40 such decisions. The only difference between them is that the
probabilities and amounts in Option A and B will differ.
You have a 1-in-10 chance of being paid for one of these decisions. The selection is made
with a 10-sided die. If the roll of the die gives the number 1 you will be paid for one of the 40
decisions, but if the roll gives any other number you will not be paid. If you are paid for one of these
40 decisions, then we will further select one of these decisions by rolling a 4-sided and a 10-sided
die. A third die roll with a 10-sided die determines the payment for your choice of Option A or B.
When you make your choices you will not know which decision is selected for payment. You should
therefore treat each decision as if it might actually count for payment.
If you are being paid for one of the decisions, we will pay you according to your choice in
the selected decision. You will then receive the money at the end of the experiment. 
Before making your choices you will have a chance to practice so that you better understand
the consequences of your choices. Please proceed on the computer to the practice task. You will be
paid in caramels for this practice task. 
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[Subjects make decisions in the practice RA task.]
I will now come around and pay you in caramels for your choice of A or B. I will ask you to
roll a 10-sided die to determine the payment for your choice of A or B. Please proceed to the actual
task after your earnings are recorded. You will have a 1-in-10 chance of being paid for one of the 40
decisions in the actual task.
Password 3:____
[Subjects make decisions in the actual RA task.]
I will now come around and ask you to roll a 10-sided die to determine if you are being paid
for one of the decisions. If the roll of the die gives the number 1 you will be paid for one of the 40
decisions, but if the roll gives any other number you will not be paid. If you are paid for one of the
40 decisions, then I will ask you to roll a 4-sided and a 10-sided die to select one of the decisions for
payment. A third die roll with a 10-sided die determines the payment for your choice of Option A or
B. 
Password 4:____
[Roll 10-sided die to determine if they are being paid.]
[Roll 4-sided and 10-sided dice to determine the decision for payment.]
[Roll 10-sided die to determine payment in Option A and B.]
You will now continue with the third task. I will distribute the instructions and then read it
out loud. 
[ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROVIDED HERE]
B. Typical Screen Shots for Lottery Choices
The first screen shot on the next page shows the full screen within which the text box is
contained, so that one gets an impression of what the subject encountered in all screen shots. Then
we display more detailed screen shots of the practice example and the first few lottery choices. Prior
to each block of 10 lottery choices the subject was told that the lottery prizes for the next 10 choices
would stay the same and the only thing that would vary would be the probabilities. We then show
the sequence of the first two lotteries, and then lottery 11 which uses new prizes.
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C. Typical Screen Shots for Discounting Choices
The next page shows the practice example provided at the beginning of these tasks. The top
panel shows the initial screen shot, and then the next two panels show how the selected option is
highlighted to make it clear to the subject which option is being selected.
The following page shows the information that was given to each subject prior to each block
of 10 choices. This information was that the principal and horizon would remain constant for the
next 10 choices, but that the only thing that would change would be the amount in the “later”
option. In these displays the implied interest rate is displayed.
Finally, after the first 10 choices a new horizon was selected for the next 10 choices.
-45-
-46-
-47-
D. Parameter Values
Table B1 shows the parameters of the lottery choice tasks, and Table B2 shows the
parameters of the discounting choice tasks.
In Table B1 the parameters are (1) the decision number, (2) the probability of the high prize
in each lottery, (3) the high prize of lottery A, in kroner, (4) the low prize of lottery A, in kroner, (5)
the high prize of lottery B, in kroner, (6) the low prize of lottery B, in kroner, (7) the expected value
of lottery A, and (8) the expected value of lottery B. The information in columns (7) and (8) was not
presented to subjects.
Table B1: Parameters for Lottery Choices
Decision
Probability
of High Prize
Lottery A
High Prize 
Lottery A
Low Prize
Lottery B
High Prize
Lottery B
Low Prize
EV of
Lottery A
EV of
Lottery B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 0.1 1125 750 2000 250 787.5 425
2 0.2 1125 750 2000 250 825 600
3 0.3 1125 750 2000 250 862.5 775
4 0.4 1125 750 2000 250 900 950
5 0.5 1125 750 2000 250 937.5 1125
6 0.6 1125 750 2000 250 975 1300
7 0.7 1125 750 2000 250 1012.5 1475
8 0.8 1125 750 2000 250 1050 1650
9 0.9 1125 750 2000 250 1087.5 1825
10 1 1125 750 2000 250 1125 2000
11 0.1 1000 875 2000 75 887.5 267.5
12 0.2 1000 875 2000 75 900 460
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13 0.3 1000 875 2000 75 912.5 652.5
14 0.4 1000 875 2000 75 925 845
15 0.5 1000 875 2000 75 937.5 1037.5
16 0.6 1000 875 2000 75 950 1230
17 0.7 1000 875 2000 75 962.5 1422.5
18 0.8 1000 875 2000 75 975 1615
19 0.9 1000 875 2000 75 987.5 1807.5
20 1 1000 875 2000 75 1000 2000
21 0.1 2000 1600 3850 100 1640 475
22 0.2 2000 1600 3850 100 1680 850
23 0.3 2000 1600 3850 100 1720 1225
24 0.4 2000 1600 3850 100 1760 1600
25 0.5 2000 1600 3850 100 1800 1975
26 0.6 2000 1600 3850 100 1840 2350
27 0.7 2000 1600 3850 100 1880 2725
28 0.8 2000 1600 3850 100 1920 3100
29 0.9 2000 1600 3850 100 1960 3475
30 1 2000 1600 3850 100 2000 3850
31 0.1 2500 1000 4500 50 1125 495
32 0.2 2500 1000 4500 50 1250 940
33 0.3 2500 1000 4500 50 1375 1385
34 0.4 2500 1000 4500 50 1500 1830
35 0.5 2500 1000 4500 50 1625 2275
36 0.6 2500 1000 4500 50 1750 2720
37 0.7 2500 1000 4500 50 1875 3165
38 0.8 2500 1000 4500 50 2000 3610
39 0.9 2500 1000 4500 50 2125 4055
40 1 2500 1000 4500 50 2500 4500
In Table B2 the parameters are (1) the horizon in months, (2) the task number in sequence if
this horizon was selected for the subject to make choices over, (3) the principal of 3000 kroner if the
subject had the “higher stakes” condition, (4) the principal of 1500 kroner if the subject had the
“lower stakes” condition, (5) the annual interest rate presented to the subject if that treatment was
applied (this is also the annual effective rate with annual compounding), (6) the delayed payment if
the subject had the “higher stakes” condition, (7) the delayed payment if the subject had the “lower
stakes” condition, (8) the implied annual effective rate with quarterly compounding, and (9) the
implied annual effective rate with daily compounding. The values in columns (8) and (9) were not
presented to subjects.
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Table B2: Parameters for Discounting Choices
 
Horizon
in
months Task
Principal
in high
stakes
Principal
if low
stakes
Annual
Interest
Rate
Delayed
Payment
if low stakes
Delayed
Payment
if high stakes
AER
Quarterly
AER
Daily
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.5 1 3000 1500 5% 3006.10 1503.05 5.1% 5.1%
0.5 2 3000 1500 10% 3011.94 1505.97 10.4% 10.5%
0.5 3 3000 1500 15% 3017.52 1508.76 15.9% 16.2%
0.5 4 3000 1500 20% 3022.88 1511.44 21.6% 22.1%
0.5 5 3000 1500 25% 3028.02 1514.01 27.4% 28.4%
0.5 6 3000 1500 30% 3032.98 1516.49 33.5% 35.0%
0.5 7 3000 1500 35% 3037.75 1518.87 39.9% 41.9%
0.5 8 3000 1500 40% 3042.36 1521.18 46.4% 49.1%
0.5 9 3000 1500 45% 3046.81 1523.40 53.2% 56.8%
0.5 10 3000 1500 50% 3051.11 1525.56 60.2% 64.8%
1 1 3000 1500 5% 3012.22 1506.11 5.1% 5.1%
1 2 3000 1500 10% 3023.92 1511.96 10.4% 10.5%
1 3 3000 1500 15% 3035.14 1517.57 15.9% 16.2%
1 4 3000 1500 20% 3045.93 1522.96 21.6% 22.1%
1 5 3000 1500 25% 3056.31 1528.15 27.4% 28.4%
1 6 3000 1500 30% 3066.31 1533.16 33.5% 35.0%
1 7 3000 1500 35% 3075.97 1537.99 39.9% 41.9%
1 8 3000 1500 40% 3085.31 1542.65 46.4% 49.1%
1 9 3000 1500 45% 3094.34 1547.17 53.2% 56.8%
1 10 3000 1500 50% 3103.10 1551.55 60.2% 64.8%
2 1 3000 1500 5% 3024.49 1512.25 5.1% 5.1%
2 2 3000 1500 10% 3048.04 1524.02 10.4% 10.5%
2 3 3000 1500 15% 3070.70 1535.35 15.9% 16.2%
2 4 3000 1500 20% 3092.56 1546.28 21.6% 22.1%
2 5 3000 1500 25% 3113.67 1556.84 27.4% 28.4%
2 6 3000 1500 30% 3134.09 1567.05 33.5% 35.0%
2 7 3000 1500 35% 3153.87 1576.93 39.9% 41.9%
2 8 3000 1500 40% 3173.04 1586.52 46.4% 49.1%
2 9 3000 1500 45% 3191.65 1595.83 53.2% 56.8%
2 10 3000 1500 50% 3209.74 1604.87 60.2% 64.8%
3 1 3000 1500 5% 3036.82 1518.41 5.1% 5.1%
3 2 3000 1500 10% 3072.34 1536.17 10.4% 10.5%
3 3 3000 1500 15% 3106.67 1553.34 15.9% 16.2%
3 4 3000 1500 20% 3139.91 1569.95 21.6% 22.1%
3 5 3000 1500 25% 3172.11 1586.06 27.4% 28.4%
3 6 3000 1500 30% 3203.37 1601.68 33.5% 35.0%
3 7 3000 1500 35% 3233.74 1616.87 39.9% 41.9%
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3 8 3000 1500 40% 3263.27 1631.64 46.4% 49.1%
3 9 3000 1500 45% 3292.03 1646.01 53.2% 56.8%
3 10 3000 1500 50% 3320.05 1660.02 60.2% 64.8%
4 1 3000 1500 5% 3049.19 1524.59 5.1% 5.1%
4 2 3000 1500 10% 3096.84 1548.42 10.4% 10.5%
4 3 3000 1500 15% 3143.07 1571.53 15.9% 16.2%
4 4 3000 1500 20% 3187.98 1593.99 21.6% 22.1%
4 5 3000 1500 25% 3231.65 1615.83 27.4% 28.4%
4 6 3000 1500 30% 3274.18 1637.09 33.5% 35.0%
4 7 3000 1500 35% 3315.63 1657.81 39.9% 41.9%
4 8 3000 1500 40% 3356.07 1678.03 46.4% 49.1%
4 9 3000 1500 45% 3395.55 1697.78 53.2% 56.8%
4 10 3000 1500 50% 3434.14 1717.07 60.2% 64.8%
5 1 3000 1500 5% 3061.61 1530.81 5.1% 5.1%
5 2 3000 1500 10% 3121.53 1560.77 10.4% 10.5%
5 3 3000 1500 15% 3179.89 1589.94 15.9% 16.2%
5 4 3000 1500 20% 3236.78 1618.39 21.6% 22.1%
5 5 3000 1500 25% 3292.31 1646.15 27.4% 28.4%
5 6 3000 1500 30% 3346.55 1673.28 33.5% 35.0%
5 7 3000 1500 35% 3399.59 1699.80 39.9% 41.9%
5 8 3000 1500 40% 3451.50 1725.75 46.4% 49.1%
5 9 3000 1500 45% 3502.34 1751.17 53.2% 56.8%
5 10 3000 1500 50% 3552.16 1776.08 60.2% 64.8%
6 1 3000 1500 5% 3074.09 1537.04 5.1% 5.1%
6 2 3000 1500 10% 3146.43 1573.21 10.4% 10.5%
6 3 3000 1500 15% 3217.14 1608.57 15.9% 16.2%
6 4 3000 1500 20% 3286.34 1643.17 21.6% 22.1%
6 5 3000 1500 25% 3354.10 1677.05 27.4% 28.4%
6 6 3000 1500 30% 3420.53 1710.26 33.5% 35.0%
6 7 3000 1500 35% 3485.69 1742.84 39.9% 41.9%
6 8 3000 1500 40% 3549.65 1774.82 46.4% 49.1%
6 9 3000 1500 45% 3612.48 1806.24 53.2% 56.8%
6 10 3000 1500 50% 3674.23 1837.12 60.2% 64.8%
7 1 3000 1500 5% 3086.61 1543.30 5.1% 5.1%
7 2 3000 1500 10% 3171.52 1585.76 10.4% 10.5%
7 3 3000 1500 15% 3254.83 1627.42 15.9% 16.2%
7 4 3000 1500 20% 3336.65 1668.32 21.6% 22.1%
7 5 3000 1500 25% 3417.06 1708.53 27.4% 28.4%
7 6 3000 1500 30% 3496.14 1748.07 33.5% 35.0%
7 7 3000 1500 35% 3573.96 1786.98 39.9% 41.9%
7 8 3000 1500 40% 3650.59 1825.29 46.4% 49.1%
7 9 3000 1500 45% 3726.08 1863.04 53.2% 56.8%
7 10 3000 1500 50% 3800.50 1900.25 60.2% 64.8%
-51-
8 1 3000 1500 5% 3099.18 1549.59 5.1% 5.1%
8 2 3000 1500 10% 3196.81 1598.40 10.4% 10.5%
8 3 3000 1500 15% 3292.96 1646.48 15.9% 16.2%
8 4 3000 1500 20% 3387.73 1693.86 21.6% 22.1%
8 5 3000 1500 25% 3481.19 1740.60 27.4% 28.4%
8 6 3000 1500 30% 3573.42 1786.71 33.5% 35.0%
8 7 3000 1500 35% 3664.46 1832.23 39.9% 41.9%
8 8 3000 1500 40% 3754.39 1877.20 46.4% 49.1%
8 9 3000 1500 45% 3843.26 1921.63 53.2% 56.8%
8 10 3000 1500 50% 3931.11 1965.56 60.2% 64.8%
9 1 3000 1500 5% 3111.81 1555.91 5.1% 5.1%
9 2 3000 1500 10% 3222.30 1611.15 10.4% 10.5%
9 3 3000 1500 15% 3331.54 1665.77 15.9% 16.2%
9 4 3000 1500 20% 3439.59 1719.80 21.6% 22.1%
9 5 3000 1500 25% 3546.53 1773.27 27.4% 28.4%
9 6 3000 1500 30% 3652.40 1826.20 33.5% 35.0%
9 7 3000 1500 35% 3757.26 1878.63 39.9% 41.9%
9 8 3000 1500 40% 3861.16 1930.58 46.4% 49.1%
9 9 3000 1500 45% 3964.12 1982.06 53.2% 56.8%
9 10 3000 1500 50% 4066.21 2033.10 60.2% 64.8%
11 1 3000 1500 5% 3137.22 1568.61 5.1% 5.1%
11 2 3000 1500 10% 3273.89 1636.95 10.4% 10.5%
11 3 3000 1500 15% 3410.05 1705.03 15.9% 16.2%
11 4 3000 1500 20% 3545.72 1772.86 21.6% 22.1%
11 5 3000 1500 25% 3680.91 1840.46 27.4% 28.4%
11 6 3000 1500 30% 3815.66 1907.83 33.5% 35.0%
11 7 3000 1500 35% 3949.97 1974.99 39.9% 41.9%
11 8 3000 1500 40% 4083.87 2041.94 46.4% 49.1%
11 9 3000 1500 45% 4217.37 2108.69 53.2% 56.8%
11 10 3000 1500 50% 4350.49 2175.25 60.2% 64.8%
12 1 3000 1500 5% 3150 1575 5.1% 5.1%
12 2 3000 1500 10% 3300 1650 10.4% 10.5%
12 3 3000 1500 15% 3450 1725 15.9% 16.2%
12 4 3000 1500 20% 3600 1800 21.6% 22.1%
12 5 3000 1500 25% 3750 1875 27.4% 28.4%
12 6 3000 1500 30% 3900 1950 33.5% 35.0%
12 7 3000 1500 35% 4050 2025 39.9% 41.9%
12 8 3000 1500 40% 4200 2100 46.4% 49.1%
12 9 3000 1500 45% 4350 2175 53.2% 56.8%
12 10 3000 1500 50% 4500 2250 60.2% 64.8%
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Appendix C: Additional Literature Review (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Ainslie and Haendel [1983; p.131-133] report experiments with 18 patients in a
substance abuse program that made 66 choices over several weeks. Each subject earned a
certain amount of money in an unrelated task during the week, ranging from $2 up to $10;
call that $x. They were given a choice between receiving that $x in 7 days, or receiving $1.25x
in 10 days. Then, on the 7th day, they were given a choice between receiving $x on that day or
receiving $1.25x in 3 days. It is implied that this second choice was for the same $x, and not
an additional choice, so subjects were allowed to change their minds on the 7th day. Observed
behavior was generally consistent with exponential discounting for the majority of choices:
35% of the choices were consistently for the earlier option, and 27% of the choices were
consistently for the later option. On the other hand, one-third were consistent with
hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic preferences, and entailed a shift from the later option to the
sooner option. Thus there is, overall, evidence in favor of non-constant discounting, but for a
minority of the observed choices.19 It is not possible to draw any inferences about average
discount rates from these data.
Holcomb and Nelson [1992] is an important study that is reviewed in the text. We
collated the data reported in the study into a format that is amenable to statistical analysis, and
report those data in Table C1 below. The annual rate calculated in Table C1 uses daily
compounding, consistent with our other calculations. Table C2 then reports the results of
estimating a “grouped” logit estimation on the fraction of the 101 subjects that delayed. The
results of the estimation are listed, and then the marginal effect of each covariate on the
expected number of subjects to delay. Since the population size is 101, these marginal effects
19 They also report (p.133) a small follow-up experiment with 5 subjects and a front end delay of two
weeks. In that case 4 of the 5 choices entailed a switch from the later payment to the earlier payment. 
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can be interpreted as the effect of the covariate on the percentage of the sample that delayed.
Responses to the “dummy” tasks that offered a 0% interest rate are not included in this
analysis (nor do Holcomb and Nelson [1992] report detailed data for them).
Raineri and Rachlin [1993] examined behavior in a series of experiments involving
hypothetical choices. Their Experiment 1 is the most relevant for our purposes; the others
involved variations in the duration of consumption of the income flows, and the use of non-
monetary rewards that were also hypothetical. In Experiment 1 120 students participated as a
requirement in an undergraduate psychology course. Each choice task involved a fixed
amount y in the future, and an alternative, smaller amount x now. The value of x was varied
using the “up-down staircase” or “titration” method: an initial value of x is shown, and if the
subject picks x the next alternative xN is lower than x; otherwise, it is higher than x but still
lower than y. If these were for real rewards, and the subjects inferred the dependence of
future choice options on current choices, then there is an obvious incentive compatibility
problem with this procedure; sadly, this does not stop it being used by economists, as
reviewed by Harrison and Rutström [2008; §1.5]. Horizons of 1 month, 6 months, 1, 5, 10, 25
and 50 years were used; the amount y varying from $100 to $10000 and up to $1 million; and
increasing and decreasing titrations employed for each task. Results are reported descriptively.
For each titration choice a simple average of the two values at which the subject switched
choice are taken, averages taken of the ascending and descending titration for that subject and
choice, and then the median taken across all subjects for each condition. The main results can
be illustrated by considering the three shortest horizons. For the $100 amount the daily-
compounded discount rate implied by this statistic is 127%, 71% and 54%, respectively, for
the 1-month, 6-month and 1-year horizons; for the $10000 amount the rates are 12%, 32%
and 29%, respectively; and for the $1 million amount the rates are 12%, 8% and 11%,
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respectively. For the longest horizons, which are very long indeed, there is no difference in
elicited discount rates. Thus we do see a magnitude effect for the smallest amount compared
to the two higher amounts, and mixed evidence that favors the magnitude effect for the two
higher amounts.
Shelley [1993] replicates and extends the design of Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil
[1989]. She poses 96 hypothetical fill-in-the-blank questions to 88 accounting students, and
evaluates responses from 74 that completed the questionnaire “consistently.” She varied the
sign of the monetary amounts (positive or negative), the linguistic frame employed to
motivate the context (delay, expedited, and neutral), the horizon (6 months, and 1, 2 and 4
years), and of course the amount ($40, $200, $1000 or $5000). Detailed results are not
presented, and the only inferences one can draw about the magnitude effect come from
“eyeballing” her Figure 5 (p. 812) to infer discount rates for the amounts and frames; hence
these estimates are pooled over horizon. For the neutral frame the discount rates are 24%,
15%, 14% and 14% for each amount in increasing order; for the delay frame the rates are
17%, 14%, 15% and 16%; and for the expedite frame the rates are 17%, 17%, 15% and 15%,
respectively. Apart from one cell, the neutral frame and the $40 amount, there is no evidence
of a clear magnitude effect in these responses.
Green, Fristoe and Myerson [1994] examine hypothetical choices by 24
undergraduate students that volunteered for the task in return for a $5 flat fee. Their design
used a dynamic sequence of questions, explained below, spanning horizons of 1 week, 1
month and 3 months, principals of $20, $100 and $500, and front end delays of 0 days, 1
week, 2 weeks, 1 month and 3 months. The $20 principal was always paired with a $50 later
payment; the $100 principal with a $250 later payment; and the $500 principal with a $1250
later payment. Each pair of money amounts were used in a series of questions that had four
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stages. The initial binary choice might have been between $20 now and $50 in one week, and
every subject expected to select the later option. Then the sequences of stages was as follows:
1. a series of binary choice questions in which the delay to the receipt of the later
amount was increased steadily until the sooner option was picked once (e.g., $20 now
or $50 in one month);
2. the addition of a small and increasing front end delay on the final pair from stage 1
until the subject switched back to the later option twice in a row (e.g., $20 in one
week or $50 in 3 months and one week);
3. a single binary choice “check” in which the front end delay on the final pair from
stage 2 was removed (the subject should switch back to the sooner option, given the
response on the final pair from stage 1); and
4. the addition of a small and increasing front end delay on the pair used in stage 3 until
the subject switched back to the later option once.
This process was then repeated for each of the pairs of amounts. The data are not reported in
terms of summary statistics of discount rates or discount factors, and no clear conclusions
drawn about the effect of magnitude.  But one can draw inferences from quadratic
polynomial regression equations estimated to fit the observed delays between amounts that
were needed to make them equivalent (their Table 1, p. 387).  If we assume no front end
delay then the intercept terms on these estimated equations tells us the number of weeks, on
average, that were needed to make the current amount equivalent in present value to the later
amount. This $20 now is equal on average to $50 with a delay of 44.1 weeks, $100 now is
equal on average to $250 with a delay of 61.9 weeks, and $500 now is equal on average to
$1250 with a delay of 146.0 weeks. These convert into daily-compounded annual rates of
100%, 71% and 30%, respectively. Without any knowledge of the noise associated with these
estimates, there does indeed appear to be a magnitude effect as payoffs are scaled up by 5 or
25.
Green, Fry and Myerson [1994] employed hypothetical choices and a titration
method to ascertain the amount of money now that would be equivalent to a fixed amount in
the future. Focusing on their data with adults, the fixed amounts were $1,000 and $10,000 and
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the horizons considered were 1 week, 1 and 6 months, 1, 3, 5, 10 and 25 years. The data are
not reported in terms of discount rates or discount factors, but there are detailed coefficient
estimates of a generalized hyperbolic specification that can be used to infer these (their Table
1, p. 35). For the 12 younger adults evaluated, discount rates were 63%, 54%, 46%, 32% and
25% for the delayed amount of $1,000 and each horizon; for the $10,000 delayed amount the
implied discount rates were 40%, 34%, 29%, 19% and 15%. Although there is evidence of a
magnitude effect in these point estimates, there is no way to evaluate sampling errors for
these values. For the 12 older adults evaluated, discount rates were 12%, 12%, 12%, 12% and
11% for the delayed amount of $1000 and each horizon; for the $10000 delayed amount the
implied discount rates were 8%, 8%, 8%, 7% and 7%. Thus there is no evidence of a
quantitatively large magnitude effect, nor incidentally any evidence of declining discount rates
conditional on the magnitude of the delayed amount. Again, there is no means of ascertaining
statistical significance of these results from the reported point estimates.
Kirby and Maraković [1995] used a first-price sealed-offer auction between 3 subjects
to elicit the present value of a future amount, and acknowledge that an optimal (risk-neutral)
bid would be above the true valuation (just as an optimal bid for a risk-neutral agent in a first-
price sealed-bid auction is below the true valuation). They also conducted auctions with only 3
bidders, which makes the optimal overstatement more severe than if the auction were for
many more bidders: as the number of bidders increase the mis-statement decreases quite
rapidly. In principle one can infer the true valuations from observed bids, but only if one
estimates the risk attitudes of bidders and assumes some symmetric Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium. Furthermore, they deceived subjects and actually had them bid against simulated
opponents.
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Chapman and Elstein [1995] examine discounting behavior in hypothetical tasks in
which the choices are framed as delays in receipt of lottery prize earnings (or health
outcomes, ignored here). All subjects were psychology undergraduates fulfilling a course
credit requirement. In experiment #1 70 subjects answered 48 questions in which they were
asked to state the delayed amount that would be the same as the amount now that was
presented to them. The principals were $200, $1000, $5000 and $25000, and the horizons
were 6 months, 1, 2 and 4 years. Geometric averages of annualized discount rates can be
eyeballed from Figure 1 (p. 378) and exhibit a magnitude effect for the lower amounts. For
the 6 month horizon the geometric average discount rate for the $200 principal was roughly
400%, but was only 210% for the $1000 principal and 75% for the two highest principals.
The effect diminished for the 1 year horizon, to be roughly 200% for the $200 principal and
125% for the $1000 principal. In experiment #2 similar procedures were used, with principals
of $500, $1000, $2060 and $4000 and horizons of 1, 3, 6 and 12 years. Again, geometric
means can be eyeballed from Figure 2 (p. 382), and show a smaller magnitude effect than
experiment #1. Discount rates for the $500 principal were roughly 150% for the 1-year
horizon, 125% for the $1000 principal, and 50% for the higher principals. A sharp decay set
in after the 3 year horizon. It is not possible to infer sampling error from these Figures.
Kirby, Petry and Bickel [1999] is an important study that is reviewed in the text. We
collated the data reported in their study into a format that is amenable to statistical analysis,
and report those data in Table C3 below. We focus solely on their “controls,” since the other
subjects were known heroin addicts. Table C4 then reports the results of estimating a
“grouped” logit estimation on the fraction of the 60 subjects that delayed. The results of the
estimation are listed, and then the marginal effect of each covariate on the expected number
of subjects to delay. Since the population size is 60, these marginal effects can be scaled up by
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just less than 2 and then interpreted as the effect of the covariate on the percentage of the
sample that delayed.
Chapman and Winquist [1998] study discounting behavior in the context of
different frames about the task. In one frame the subjects are told that they have won a
lottery, and can defer payment of a larger prize for 3 months; in the other frame they are told
that they have received a speeding ticket and can defer payment of a larger fine for 3
months.20 The subject is asked to fill-in-the-blank for the later amount. The principal amounts
used in this case are much smaller than typically used in psychology experiments: $5, $7.50,
$10, $15, $20, $30, $40, $60, $80 and $160. The discount rates implied by these choices are
not displayed, but can be roughly inferred from Figure 1 (p. 121) and are very, very high.
Consider the lottery frame. For the amounts of $20 and less the rates are in excess of 2000%
on an annual basis, declining from roughly 5000% at $5 to “just under” 2000% at $30. Even
at $160, the rates are in excess of 1000%. Although the implied rates for the speeding ticket
frame are lower, all lie between 700% or so and 100% or so, declining with magnitude of the
principal. Quite apart from the decline in elicited rates with magnitude, the incredible levels of
these rates are an important signal to what might actually be going on in many of these
experiments, discussed in §5.
Green, Myerson and McFadden [1997] followed the same procedures as Green,
Fry and Myerson [1994]. They used 24 volunteer students, with a fixed delayed amounts and a
range of options available now. The fixed delayed amount was either $100, $2000, $25000 or
$100000, and the horizons considered were 3 months, 6 months, 1, 3, 5, 10 and 20 years.
There were 24 amounts available now, with discount factors between 1% and 99%, with
smaller increments closer to either extreme. Each subject either received the sooner options
20 There are additional tipping frames presented and compared to these standard frames.
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in ascending or descending order, and the binary choice questions were terminated when a
switch was observed. All choices were hypothetical. Their Table 1 (p.717) reports average
discount factors, from which one can infer daily-compounded discount rates. For the $100
principal, average discount rates were 75%, 50%, 39%, 17%, 18%, 10% and 8% for each
horizon, respectively; for the $2000 principal the rates were 21%, 19%, 12%, 10%, 12%, 10%
and 7%, respectively. So there is a significant decline in discount rates with this change in
magnitude, at least for horizons up to 5 years. Of course, no sampling errors are reported in
these data. For the $25000 principal the rates were 12%, 10%, 9%, 8%, 8%, 5% and 6%,
respectively, so it is only for the two shortest horizons that one sees a continuing magnitude
effect.
Du, Green and Myerson [2002] examined the hypothetical discount behavior of 79
Chinese, Japanese and American graduate students. Horizons were 1, 3 and 9 months, and 2,
5, 10 and 20 years; the delayed, fixed amounts were either $200 or $10000. Titration was
employed to find the amount to be received now that was equal to the fixed, delayed amount.
The first iteration was to offer 50% of the amount, and then adjusted five times based on
observed responses in the previous choice task. In principle one could eyeball their Figure 1
(p. 486) and guess at discount factors for different horizons, but the scale of the graphs does
not allow any useful precision in this exercise. 
Estle, Green, Myerson and Holt [2007] applied titration methods for hypothetical
discounting tasks over delayed payments of $40 or $100. Horizons were 1 week, 1 month, 6
months, 1 year and 3 years. The 47 subjects were students completing a course credit. A
generalized hyperbolic was fit to the observed data, and the area under the “discount factor
curve” used as a measure of the degree of discounting. They report an ANOVA analysis of
the effect of magnitude, and that it shows a significant effect. However, it is possible to infer
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the proximate size of discount rates by eyeballing their Figure 1 (p. 60) to ascertain the
discount factor, and then deriving the implied discount rate. Assuming discount factors of
0.98, 0.95, 0.78 and 0.65 for the $40 amount and the first four horizons, and discount factors
of 0.99, 0.97, 0.85 and 0.75 for the $100 amount and the same horizons, one can infer annual
discount rates with daily compounding of 735%, 62%, 50% and 43% for the $40 amount, and
364%, 37%, 33% and 29% for the $100 amount. Rough as these inferences are, and absent
any standard errors, the magnitude effect pattern is clear.
Scholten and Read [2010] administered a web-based survey to 196 individuals,
offering them a choice between $250 ($100) [$50] {$25} in 19 months or $295 ($118) [$59]
{29.50} in 22 months, or between $250 ($100) [$50] {$25} in 16 months or $340 ($136) [$68]
{34} in 22 months. The first set of choices therefore offered a constant 18% nominal rate of
return, and the second set of choices offered a constant 36% nominal rate of return. The
fraction of subjects taking the sooner option was 0.29 (0.60) [0.62] {0.68} for the first set,
and 0.13 (0.38) [0.22] {0.47} for the second set. All choices were hypothetical. The results
suggest a magnitude effect as one moves from the $250 principal to the lower amounts, but
very little effect for the lower three principal values.
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Table C1: Data from Holcomb and Nelson [1992]
Task
FED in
Days Principal
Horizon in
Days
Delayed
Amount
Fraction
Delaying
Daily
Rate (%)
Annual
Rate (%)
1 0 $5 1 $5.14 0.225 2.8 1008
2 0 $17 7 $18.86 0.423 1.49 538
3 1 $5 1 $5.07 0.113 1.4 504
4 7 $5 7 $5.54 0.282 1.48 531
5 0 $17 14 $20.94 0.704 1.5 540
6 1 $5 7 $5.54 0.268 1.48 531
7 0 $5 14 $6.15 0.408 1.49 536
8 0 $17 7 $20.90 0.789 2.99 1078
9 1 $5 1 $5.14 0.197 2.8 1008
10 1 $17 14 $25.71 0.915 3 1079
11 7 $17 7 $18.86 0.437 1.49 538
12 0 $5 14 $7.56 0.563 3 1079
13 1 $17 7 $18.86 0.408 1.49 538
14 0 $5 7 $6.14 0.409 2.98 1072
15 0 $17 1 $17.26 0.324 1.53 551
16 1 $17 1 $17.51 0.451 3 1080
17 7 $17 14 $20.90 0.803 1.49 535
18 1 $5 14 $6.15 0.281 1.49 536
19 0 $17 14 $25.71 0.873 3 1079
20 1 $17 14 $20.94 0.563 1.5 540
21 1 $5 7 $6.14 0.395 2.98 1072
22 1 $17 1 $17.26 0.31 1.53 551
23 1 $5 14 $7.56 0.563 3 1079
24 0 $5 7 $5.54 0.211 1.48 531
25 7 $5 14 $6.14 0.437 1.48 532
26 0 $5 1 $5.07 0.183 1.4 504
27 0 $17 1 $17.51 0.535 3 1080
28 0 $17 7 $20.90 0.789 2.99 1078
29 7 $17 14 $25.71 0.862 3 1079
30 7 $17 1 $17.26 0.31 1.53 551
31 7 $17 14 $20.94 0.655 1.5 540
32 0 $5 1 $5.00 0 0 0
33 0 $5 7 $5.00 0 0 0
34 0 $17 1 $17.00 0 0 0
35 0 $17 7 $17.00 0 0 0
36 1 $5 7 $5.00 0 0 0
37 7 $5 14 $6.15 0.345 1.49 536
38 7 $5 1 $5.07 0.207 1.4 504
39 7 $5 15 $7.50 0.211 2.74 986
40 7 $5 1 $5.14 0.31 2.8 1008
41 7 $17 1 $17.51 0.558 3 1080
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Table C2: Grouped Logistic Analysis of Holcomb and Nelson [1992] Data
Logistic regression for grouped data              Number of obs   =       3636
                                                  LR chi2(4)      =     645.92
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -2180.8345                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1290
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    _outcome |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         fed |  -.0023871   .0120324    -0.20   0.843    -.0259702    .0211961
      amount |   .1060896     .00618    17.17   0.000     .0939769    .1182022
     horizon |   3.009402   .2038066    14.77   0.000     2.609949    3.408856
      dailyc |   .0015718   .0001433    10.97   0.000     .0012909    .0018528
       _cons |  -3.373304   .1642249   -20.54   0.000    -3.695179   -3.051429
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marginal effects after blogit
      y  = E(cases) (predict)
         =  44.725602
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
     fed |  -.0594851      .29985   -0.20   0.843  -.647175  .528204   2.63889
  amount |   2.643738      .15365   17.21   0.000   2.34259  2.94488        11
 horizon |    74.9939     5.07048   14.79   0.000   65.0559  84.9319   .258333
  dailyc |   .0391694      .00357   10.97   0.000   .032171  .046167   766.945
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table C3: Data from Kirby, Petry and Bickel [1999; Table 3]
Task
Order Principal
Delayed
Amount
Delay in
Days
Percent of
Addicts Delaying
Percent of
Controls Delaying
13 $34 $35 186 0 0
1 $54 $55 117 4 2
9 $78 $80 162 4 2
20 $28 $30 179 2 0
6 $47 $50 160 0 2
17 $80 $85 157 0 0
26 $22 $25 136 4 0
24 $54 $60 111 0 5
12 $67 $75 119 5 3
22 $25 $30 80 7 3
16 $49 $60 89 9 10
15 $69 $85 91 7 20
3 $19 $25 53 21 22
10 $40 $55 62 13 20
2 $55 $75 61 39 33
18 $24 $35 29 18 30
21 $34 $50 30 34 52
25 $54 $80 30 41 67
5 $14 $25 19 43 72
14 $27 $50 21 55 85
23 $41 $75 20 68 90
7 $15 $35 13 68 90
8 $25 $60 14 82 93
19 $33 $80 14 89 100
11 $11 $30 7 93 100
27 $20 $55 7 91 98
4 $31 $85 7 89 100
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Table C4: Grouped Logistic Analysis of Kirby, Petry and Bickel [1999; Table 3] Data
Controls Only (N=60)
Logistic regression for grouped data              Number of obs   =       1620
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =    1296.55
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Log likelihood = -446.30914                       Pseudo R2       =     0.5923
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    _outcome |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
   principal |   .0387394   .0068351     5.67   0.000     .0253428     .052136
     horizon |  -.0436126   .0041953   -10.40   0.000    -.0518352   -.0353899
      dailyc |   .0012892   .0001896     6.80   0.000     .0009177    .0016608
       _cons |  -.4335072   .3226488    -1.34   0.179    -1.065887    .1988728
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
. mfx compute
Marginal effects after blogit
      y  = E(cases) (predict)
         =  19.796768
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
princi~l |   .5138741      .09088    5.65   0.000   .335746  .692003   38.8889
 horizon |  -.5785163      .03425  -16.89   0.000  -.645637 -.511396   73.1111
  dailyc |   .0171015      .00347    4.92   0.000   .010294  .023909   1091.43
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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